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THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE PURCELL PRINCIPLE
Harry B. Dodsworth*
Abstract
The Purcell Principle—the idea that courts should think twice about
changing the rules before elections to avoid confusing voters—is sorely
misunderstood. Despite deriving from a three-page opinion, the Purcell
Principle has morphed into one of the Supreme Court’s most powerful
election-law doctrines. By and large, the Court has interpreted the
principle as a bright-line rule barring any judicial intervention close to
elections and has overwhelmingly used the principle to uphold voting
restrictions. That’s a problem because the Purcell Principle is not a
bright-line rule. And it’s certainly not one that rubber stamps voting
restrictions. To make matters worse, we know little about why the Court
wields the principle in this way because it has been developed on the
Court’s shadow docket. Lower courts are thus left with almost no guidance
on when the Purcell Principle applies—when is a late change likely to
cause confusion, how late is too late, and what considerations could
outweigh the principle?
This Article adds structure to the Purcell Principle. Election-related
court orders can be sorted into two categories: positive and negative.
“Positive” orders add voting restrictions, while “negative” orders
remove voting restrictions. Each category leads to different types of
confusion. Positive orders produce underinclusive voter behavior—think
bringing less identification to the polls than necessary—which risks
disenfranchisement. Negative orders, on the other hand, lead to
overinclusive voter behavior—think bringing more identification than
necessary—which tends not to prevent people from voting. That matters
because Purcell’s text and long-forgotten predecessor cases show that the
operative inquiry in a Purcell case is whether a court’s order will chill
voting. If a late rule change will not confuse voters in a way that stops
them from voting, Purcell is no reason to halt that change. This Article
argues that to safeguard the Purcell Principle’s integrity, courts ought to
adopt a “presumption of no confusion”: presume negative orders do not
confuse voters in a way that disenfranchises those voters unless evidence
suggests otherwise. In doing so, this Article reimagines Purcell in the way
most consistent with common sense, Purcell itself, and Purcell’s roots.
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INTRODUCTION
In the little-known 2006 case of Purcell v. Gonzalez,1 the Supreme Court
established the “Purcell Principle”: the idea that courts should think twice before
changing election rules close to an election.2 That idea rings true. After all, late
changes might confuse voters and keep them away from the polls. But looks can be
deceiving. Today, the Purcell Principle is one of the Court’s most controversial
election-law doctrines because it often does the very thing it sought to protect
against—prevent people from voting. We need look no further than 2020, when the

1

549 U.S. 1 (2006).
See generally Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, 43 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 427, 428 (2016) (coining the term “Purcell Principle”).
2
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principle threatened to sway the Presidential election, to understand its force.3 Voters
in swing states like Wisconsin and Florida saw the Supreme Court drastically restrict
election procedures weeks before the election—all because of the Purcell Principle.4
And after the Court doubled down on its interpretation of the principle in the last
two years,5 Purcell is not going away. For better or for worse, the Purcell Principle
is the skeleton key to future election litigation.
So, what exactly is it? The Purcell Principle arises after a litigant moves for an
injunction.6 Typically, voters challenge state voting restrictions, such as voter
identification requirements or mail-in ballot deadlines.7 But because litigation takes
a while or because the law itself is changed close to the election, courts often cannot
hear a full case on the merits before the election. So, plaintiffs first seek a
preliminary injunction to prevent the state from enforcing the law in the upcoming
election.8 When those plaintiffs prevail, courts sometimes need to craft new rules to
take the place of the enjoined rules. For example, a court enjoining a voter
identification requirement might alternatively allow voters to verify their identity
through signature matching.
The Purcell Principle tells courts to be careful when considering whether to
grant these injunctions because late rule changes might confuse voters and keep
them from voting.9 That message is rhetorically powerful: late changes could of
course confuse voters and election officials, leading to people not knowing how,
when, or where to vote. If a court changed the locations of polling places just days
before the election, for instance, many would not know where to vote. But
somewhere along the line, Purcell’s message became scrambled. What was once a

3
See Ariane de Vogue, The Legal Doctrine that Could Sway the Election, CNN (Oct.
21, 2020, 8:23 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/21/politics/purcell-election-supremecourt/index.html [https://perma.cc/YTR5-5QUJ]; Josh Gerstein, The Murky Legal Concept
that Could Swing the Election, POLITICO (Oct. 5, 2020, 07:58 PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/05/murky-legal-concept-could-swing-the-election426604 [https://perma.cc/E3FF-ZYNQ].
4
See, e.g., Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205
(2020) (per curiam) (staying an order that extended Wisconsin’s primary election mail-in
ballot deadline); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28 (2020)
(mem.) (refusing to vacate a stay on an order that extended Wisconsin’s general election
mail-in ballot deadline); Raysor v. DeSantis, 140 S. Ct. 2600 (2020) (refusing to vacate a
stay on an order that allowed those with prior felony convictions to vote even if they did not
pay all court fees).
5
See infra Part II.C (describing the 2020 election cases).
6
See infra Part I.A (describing the preliminary and permanent injunction contexts in
which Purcell arises).
7
See infra Part I.A (describing the litigation contexts in which Purcell arises).
8
See infra Part I.B (describing Purcell).
9
See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (“Court orders affecting elections,
especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent
incentive to remain away from the polls.”).
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cautionary tale that late judicial intervention might cause confusion that might
disenfranchise voters became a bright-line rule that late intervention will cause
confusion that will disenfranchise voters. As this Article shows, the latter simply
isn’t true.
What’s more, the doctrine has been developed in the dark, so we don’t know
its contours.10 Purcell Principle cases arise on the “shadow docket,” the Court’s nonmerits docket used for denials of certiorari, summary dispositions, and emergency
orders.11 Unlike cases on the merits docket, shadow docket cases are not fully briefed
or orally argued.12 Worse, orders often contain only the judgment with no
explanation or indication of how the Justices voted, leaving us to wonder why the
Court reached a particular result and who voted for it.13 This is all to say that we
know the Supreme Court cautions against late judicial intervention in elections, but
the rest is “guess work.”14 We do not know how close to the election an intervention
must be to trigger Purcell, what types of changes are most dangerous, or if some
circumstances justify a late intervention and trump the Purcell Principle.15
In the 2020 election cycle, the Purcell Principle garnered considerable attention
because courts determined that some state election rules were unlawful during a

10

See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 977 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2020)
(Rovner, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Supreme Court has evinced a pronounced skepticism of
judicial intervention in the weeks prior to an election, but has put little meat on the bones of
what has become known as the Purcell doctrine.” (citation omitted)).
11
See generally William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1 (2015) (coining the term). For proposed reforms to shadow docket
procedures, see infra Part IV.C.
12
See Baude, supra note 11, at 19; Steve Leben, Getting It Right Isn’t Enough: The
Appellate Court’s Role in Procedural Justice, 69 U. KAN. L. REV. 13, 42 (2020) (“The
shadow docket is the Court’s version of motion practice and summary decisions that don’t
get full briefing or oral argument.”). Further unlike merits cases, non-merits cases often have
not been reviewed on the merits by courts below, leaving the Supreme Court without the
benefit of lower Court opinions.
13
See id. As Justice Ginsburg put it, “[w]hen a stay is denied, it doesn’t mean we are
in fact unanimous.” Mark Sherman, Supreme Court Justices Silent over Execution Drug
Secrecy, DAILY HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE (Aug. 12, 2014), https://www.gazettenet.com/Archiv
es/2014/08/suplethaldrugs-hg-080414 [https://perma.cc/DJ45-SLQ8].
14
See Richard L. Hasen, Did the Supreme Court Kill the ‘Purcell Principle’ for Election
Litigation? Maybe, Maybe Not, ELECTION L. BLOG (Feb. 20, 2016, 1:26 PM),
https://electionlawblog.org/?p=80165 [https://perma.cc/R6QG-NCLP].
15
See Bostelmann, 977 F.3d at 644 (“Perhaps we can say . . . that Purcell . . .
establish[es] a presumption against judicial intervention close in time to an election. But how
near? As to what types of changes? Overcome by what showing? These and other questions
remain unanswered.” (citation omitted)).
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pandemic.16 For example, a district court in Wisconsin extended the mail-in ballot
deadline when postal delays meant some voters would not even receive their ballots
before the deadline to send them in.17 But the Purcell Principle is not relevant only
in a pandemic. In fact, it has had an increasing effect on our elections since 2006
and will continue to do so.18 Election litigation is on the rise,19 voting restrictions are
becoming increasingly contested partisan issues,20 and unsubstantiated claims of
voter fraud have taken hold.21 And after a wave of state legislation further restricted
voting following the 2020 election, largely on the back of these voter fraud claims,
election litigation is unlikely to go away.22
Although there has been little scholarship on Purcell, the doctrine is
increasingly drawing attention from academics as well. One scholar called for the
outright abolition of the principle.23 Others still believe the doctrine can be

16

See League of Women Voters of Fla., Inc. v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 32 F.4th 1363, 1374
(11th Cir. 2022) (staying an injunction of a new Florida election law); see also COVIDRelated Election Litigation Tracker, STANFORD-MIT HEALTHY ELECTIONS PROJECT,
https://web.mit.edu/healthyelections/www/election-litigation-tracker.html [https://perma.cc
/3G55-JY5A] (last visited Feb. 11, 2021) (finding 628 election law cases, in 436 case
families, related to the COVID-19 pandemic).
17
Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020) (per
curiam) (staying an injunction extending Wisconsin’s primary election mail-in ballot
deadline); see also Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28 (2020)
(mem.) (refusing to vacate a stay on an injunction extending Wisconsin’s general election
mail-in ballot deadline).
18
See infra Part II (describing the case law).
19
RICHARD L. HASEN, EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS: LEGISLATION, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION, AND ELECTION LAW 304 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., 2014) (showing
that election litigation has undergone more than a twofold increase in the post-2000 period
compared to the pre-2000 period). This is in part because the Court in Shelby County v.
Holder struck down Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance requirement, which
ex-ante prevented states from enacting many of the provisions now being challenged in expost litigation. 570 U.S. 529, 547 (2013); see also Hasen, supra note 2, at 445.
20
See Hasen, supra note 2, at 445 (describing the “Voting Wars,” in which “Republican
state legislatures pass laws which have made it more difficult to register and vote and
Democratic state legislatures pass laws which have made it easier to vote.”).
21
Id.
22
See BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, Voting Laws Roundup: May 2021,
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-may-2021
[https://perma.cc/8DQL-B9K2] (last visited July 17, 2022) (finding that legislators had
introduced at least 389 bills to restrict voting in 48 states for the 2021 legislative sessions, as
of May 14, 2021). The Brennan Center also found at least 880 bills to expand access to voting
were in circulation during that same time. Id. These pieces of legislation will likely lead to
an increase in election litigation.
23
See Ruoyun Gao, Note, Why the Purcell Principle Should Be Abolished, 71 DUKE
L.J. 1139, 1145 (2022).
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salvaged.24 Professor Hasen, who first charted this area and coined the term “Purcell
Principle,”25 argued that—no matter how the Court is treating it—Purcell is not a
bright-line rule barring any intervention close to elections but merely one
consideration in the factor-balancing analysis courts engage in.26 More recently,
Professor Stephanopoulos proposed greater structure through five factors courts
should consider in determining whether judicial intervention is proper.27 But none
have engaged in a full-fledged excavation of the Purcell Principle to determine what
it should stand for in light of Purcell itself, its doctrinal predecessors, and its effect
on today’s elections. This Article fills that void. The existing scholarship is correct:
courts should consider not just when an injunction will occur but also whether that
injunction is likely to cause confusion. This Article builds on that work by providing
the first framework for judging whether an injunction in an emergency election case
is likely to cause confusion.
This Article proceeds as follows, making two central contributions: one
descriptive and one normative. Part I details the contexts in which the Purcell
Principle arises. It describes the tests courts apply when considering preliminary and
permanent injunctions and when reviewing those injunctions on appeal. It then
describes the Purcell v. Gonzalez opinion itself. Part II examines the case law to
identify how the Supreme Court understands the Purcell Principle. It zeroes in on
what motivates each Justice and the emerging split between the Court’s Democratic
and Republican appointees. Part III, the Article’s main descriptive contribution, first
identifies that the Supreme Court engages in an unspoken “step zero” in its Purcell
analysis—which attempts to identify a status quo of voting procedures and then asks
whether the injunction deviated from that status quo. It concludes such an analysis
is inconsistent with Purcell because it distorts, rather than clarifies, Purcell’s key
inquiry. Part III next proposes a framework for taxonomizing injunctions in election
cases into two categories: positive and negative. Positive orders add restrictions on
24

A few more scholars have discussed Purcell incident to other issues. See, e.g.,
Michael T. Morely, Postponing Federal Elections Due to Election Emergencies, 77 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. ONLINE 179 (2020); Daniel P. Tokaji, Leave It to the Lower Courts: On
Judicial Intervention in Election Administration, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1065 (2007); David Gans,
The Roberts Court, The Shadow Docket, and the Unraveling of Voting Rights Remedies, AM.
CONST. SOC’Y (2020).
25
See generally Hasen, supra note 2.
26
Id.; see also Samuel D. Gilleran, Comment, Purcell v. Gonzales, Principle and
Problem—Native American Voting Rights in the 2018 North Dakota Elections, 55 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 445, 449–454 (2020) (pointing out that the Court has not defined how close
to an election is too close to intervene or how Purcell interacts with the injunctive relief
factors).
27
See generally Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Freeing Purcell from the Shadows, TAKE
CARE BLOG (Sept. 27, 2020), https://takecareblog.com/blog/freeing-purcell-from-theshadows [https://perma.cc/2CC4-AB86] (proposing that courts consider “(1) when a court’s
remedy will cause little voter confusion; (2) when a court’s remedy will cause little
administrator error; (3) when, if a court fails to intercede, significant disenfranchisement will
ensue; (4) when plaintiffs have diligently pursued their claim; and (5) when an election is
further rather than closer based on Congress’s judgments about election proximity”).
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voting, while negative orders remove restrictions. It concludes that, unlike negative
orders, positive orders tend to produce confusion that results in disenfranchisement.
Lastly, Part IV, the Article’s normative contribution, argues that a “presumption of
no confusion” ought to accompany negative orders: reviewing courts should
presume that confusion is unlikely unless evidence suggests otherwise. This Part
then defends the presumption by showing that it aligns with Purcell’s text and longforgotten predecessor cases, both of which show that the operative inquiry is not
simply whether voters will be confused but whether they will be confused in a way
that results in disenfranchisement—a finding that calls into question much of the
Court’s Purcell jurisprudence. Part IV concludes by discussing the normative
benefits of the proposal.
I. WHAT IS THE PURCELL PRINCIPLE?
In Purcell v. Gonzalez, the Supreme Court overturned a Ninth Circuit
injunction that had prevented Arizona from enforcing a set of strict voter
identification laws.28 The Supreme Court did so because the Ninth Circuit
overlooked whether its own order—which came close to the election—would cause
voter confusion and, as a result, keep voters away from the polls.29 On one level, the
Purcell Principle is thus fairly simple: it advises courts to think twice before
enjoining a state law on the eve of the election because doing so might disrupt the
election. But on another, the Purcell Principle is rooted in a specific rationale that
should limit its application to certain circumstances. To understand why Purcell is
misunderstood and misapplied, we must first look at its roots. Section A reviews the
basic mechanics of injunctions, including the standards that courts use to evaluate
preliminary injunctions and where the Purcell Principle fits into those standards.
Section B then provides an overview of Purcell v. Gonzales itself.
A. Injunction Mechanics
The Purcell Principle typically arises in the context of injunctions. Plaintiffs in
election cases often ask courts for a preliminary injunction—a remedy that enjoins
a party from engaging in certain behavior until the case is finally decided on the
merits.30 For example, a court might enjoin a state from enforcing its voter
identification laws until the court has a chance to decide on the merits whether those
laws are unconstitutional. When a trial court considers that motion, the Purcell
Principle comes into play, and a court must then ask itself if an injunction would run
28

549 U.S. 1, 6 (2006).
Id. at 4–5.
30
See 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2947 (3d ed. 2022 Update) (“[A] preliminary
injunction is an injunction that is issued to protect plaintiff from irreparable injury and to
preserve the court’s power to render a meaningful decision after a trial on the merits. Thus,
the court may issue a preliminary injunction, even though plaintiff’s right to permanent relief
still is uncertain.”).
29

1088

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

afoul of Purcell. The principle also applies to reviewing courts. When an appellate
court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion for an injunction, it has three options:
stay (i.e., suspend) the district court’s injunction, refuse to stay the district court’s
injunction, or issue its own injunction (if the trial court denied the motion for an
injunction).31 In making this choice, an appellate court must ask itself if the district
court’s order ran afoul of Purcell or if its own order would undermine Purcell.
To determine whether to grant a motion for a preliminary injunction or a stay,
federal courts employ a balancing test. And while the test for considering a
preliminary injunction is slightly different from the test for considering a stay, courts
consider the same four factors in some form or another: (1) the likelihood of success
on the merits, (2) the likelihood of irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted,
(3) the balance of hardships to the parties, and (4) the interest of the public at-large.32
When ruling on a motion for a permanent injunction, courts also consider these
factors, minus the likelihood of success on the merits factor.33 Somewhere within
this balancing test—most likely in the fourth, “public interest” factor—courts
consider the Purcell Principle.34 But at least two Supreme Court Justices think that
Purcell alters the factors. Those Justices believe that Purcell requires a plaintiff to
show that the merits are “entirely clearcut” in her favor, that she would suffer
irreparable harm without the injunction, that she has not “unduly delayed” the
lawsuit, and that the changes she requests are “feasible” before the election.35

31

See Portia Pedro, Stays, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 869, 883–84 (2018).
See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Similarly, the
Supreme Court may vacate an appellate court stay when (1) the case “could and very likely
would be reviewed here upon final disposition in the court of appeals,” (2) “the rights of the
parties . . . may be seriously and irreparably injured by the stay,” and (3) “the court of appeals
is demonstrably wrong in its application of accepted standards in deciding to issue the stay.”
Coleman v. Paccar Inc., 424 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1976).
33
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (“[A] plaintiff
seeking a permanent injunction must . . . demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would
not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”). Although the Court listed four factors, the
standard is still functionally the same as the preliminary injunction standard, excepting
likelihood of success on the merits. Courts typically consider the adequacy of remedies at
law as part of the irreparable harm factor, but some courts, like the Court in eBay, prefer to
list the two parts of that factor separately.
34
See Gao, supra note 23, at 1148–52.
35
Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 881 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (stating
that Purcell can be overcome when: “(i) the underlying merits are entirely clearcut in favor
of the plaintiff; (ii) the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction; (iii) the
plaintiff has not unduly delayed bringing the complaint to court; and (iv) the changes in
question are at least feasible before the election without significant cost, confusion, or
hardship”).
32
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That said, exactly how courts apply the factors is a “nearly law-free zone.”36
Some courts require that each factor independently meet a certain threshold, others
allow stronger factors to make up for weaker factors, and others still weigh certain
factors more than others or leave factors out of the analysis altogether.37 Even within
those broad categories, courts diverge in their approaches.38 So while there are
nominally clear standards, in practice, the law of preliminary injunctions and stays
is the Wild West.
B. Purcell v. Gonzalez
The Purcell Principle derives from Purcell v. Gonzalez, a 2006 case heard on
the Court’s shadow docket.39 The case arose out of Arizona’s Proposition 200, a
popular referendum measure passed in 2004 that sought to prevent voter fraud by
requiring proof of citizenship to register to vote and personal identification to
physically vote.40 In May 2006, residents of Arizona challenged these requirements,
seeking a preliminary injunction in district court.41 The district court denied that
request, but it did not do so until September 2006—just two months before the
midterm election—without issuing any findings of fact or law.42 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit reversed without explanation, temporarily enjoining Arizona’s
enforcement of the voter identification requirement.43 The district court eventually
entered findings of fact and law supporting its decision, but not until October 12,
2006, after the Ninth Circuit’s decision.44 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari
to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision.45
In a three-page per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth
Circuit’s injunction, putting Proposition 200’s restrictions back into effect before
36

See Pedro, supra note 31, at 892.
Id. at 892–96.
38
Id.
39
549 U.S. 1 (2006). The principle has a deeper history, though, which is discussed in
Part IV.B.
40
Id. at 2.
41
Id. at 3.
42
Id. at 3–4.
43
Id. The plaintiffs originally appealed the district court’s denial of a preliminary
injunction, but after the Ninth Circuit set a briefing schedule that concluded two weeks after
the election, the plaintiffs sought an injunction pending appeal from the Ninth Circuit, which
is what the Ninth Circuit granted. Id.
44
Id. (“[The District Court] concluded that ‘plaintiffs have shown a possibility of
success on the merits of some of their arguments but the Court cannot say that at this stage
they have shown a strong likelihood.’ The District Court then found the balance of harms
and the public interest counseled in favor of denying the injunction.” (citations omitted)).
45
Strangely, the Court construed the plaintiffs’ motion to stay the Ninth Circuit’s
injunction as a petition for certiorari, an incredibly rare occurrence. See Hasen, supra note 2;
see also Orin Kerr, Supreme Court Allows Voter ID Law, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 20,
2006, 5:05 PM) (referring to the move as a judicial “lightning bolt”), https://volokh.com/
posts/1161378321.shtml [https://perma.cc/3DCB-QCNQ].
37
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the election.46 The opinion began by acknowledging that, on the one hand, Arizona
has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its elections by avoiding the
appearance of voter fraud.47 But on the other, there is a possibility that “qualified
voters might be turned away from the polls,” so the district court should give “careful
consideration” to the plaintiff’s claims.48 The opinion then explained how courts
should do so:
Faced with an application to enjoin operation of voter identification
procedures just weeks before an election, the Court of Appeals was
required to weigh, in addition to the harms attendant upon issuance or
nonissuance of an injunction, considerations specific to election cases and
its own institutional procedures. Court orders affecting elections,
especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and
consequent incentive to remain away from the polls. As an election draws
closer, that risk will increase.49
And at the end of the opinion, the Court summarized its holding in the following
way: “In view of the impending election, the necessity for clear guidance to the State
of Arizona, and our conclusion regarding the Court of Appeals’ issuance of the order
we vacate the order of the Court of Appeals.”50
These few lines gave rise to the Purcell Principle. In plain English, the Court
told us that lower courts should “weigh” whether to issue an injunction in emergency
election cases by considering the typical preliminary injunction factors as well as
“considerations specific to election cases.”51 Those election-specific considerations
include (i) whether an injunction will result in “voter confusion and consequent
incentive to remain away from the polls” and (ii) whether the order provides “clear
guidance” to state election officials.52 The Court also made two more brief points. It
admonished the Ninth Circuit for failing to explain its decision, even though the
46

Purcell, 549 U.S. at 5.
Id. at 4 (“Voter fraud drives honest citizens out of the democratic process and breeds
distrust of our government. Voters who fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by
fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised.”). Many scholars today would, however, reject that
notion. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Essay, Vote Fraud in the Eye
of the Beholder: The Role of Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification
Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1759 (2008) (finding that feelings of
disenfranchisement are not correlated with voter identification laws); Richard L. Hasen, The
Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 32, 35–36 (2007) (explaining that turnout
is in fact depressed because of voter identification requirements and that African American
confidence in the electoral system is depressed because of voter identification requirements,
and questioning whether it is appropriate to balancing feelings of disenfranchisement against
actual disenfranchisement).
48
Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4.
49
Id. at 4–5.
50
Id. at 5.
51
Id. at 4.
52
Id. at 4–5.
47
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district court had itself failed to enter any findings. And it suggested that the Ninth
Circuit might have considered the fact that the losing party would seek en banc
review, something that would consume even more time, but that this consideration
should not control.53
It is clear that the Court relied on two general justifications for its holding that
courts should think twice before changing election procedures close to an election.
But many other things are unclear. The Ninth Circuit’s failure to explain its
injunction no doubt did some of the work in the decision, but as Professor Hasen
points out, it is unclear how much work.54 Nor is it clear how much the possibility
of en banc review mattered.55 We also do not know whether Purcell is a bright-line
rule. It seems fairly clear—at least to some courts and scholars—that it is not a
bright-line rule but part of the injunctive relief balancing analysis.56 The fact that
courts must “weigh” election considerations with the traditional injunction
considerations necessarily implies that the Purcell principle is not controlling.57 And
within the injunctive balancing analysis, the Purcell Principle logically fits within
the public interest prong.58 But this is not so clear to a majority of the Court, who—
without explanation—appear to treat it as a bright-line rule.59
In sum, Purcell struck down a Ninth Circuit injunction because it did not
properly weigh the special considerations that arise when an election is near. But, to
this day, many questions about Purcell remain. And rather than shed light on
Purcell’s meaning, later cases cast doubt on the little that was clear in Purcell.
II. THE PURCELL PRINCIPLE AFTER PURCELL
The Court initially applied Purcell sparingly, but since the 2014 midterms, the
principle has garnered significant attention from the Court. This section reviews
notable emergency election cases at the Supreme Court since 2006 in which Purcell
appeared to play a large part. Orders on the shadow docket, however, often lack
accompanying opinions, so we do not always know with certainty whether the
Purcell Principle drove the result in a particular case.
53

Id. at 5.
See Hasen, supra note 2.
55
Purcell, 549 U.S. at 5.
56
See, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 977 F.3d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 2020)
(Rovner, J., dissenting) (noting that courts must “carefully evaluate emergent circumstances
that threaten to interfere with the right to vote and conscientiously evaluate all of the factors
that bear on the propriety of judicial intervention to address those circumstances, including
in particular the possibility of voter confusion.”); Hasen, supra note 2, at 437–44.
57
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 27 (“[T]o weigh a factor is to take it into account . . .
not to make it dispositive in all cases . . . .”); see also Hasen, supra note 2, at 437–44
(concluding the same).
58
Hasen, supra note 2, at 429 (“[T]he Purcell principle should properly be understood
not as a stand-alone rule but instead as relevant to one of the factors (the public interest) the
Court usually considers.”).
59
See infra Part II.C.
54
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Section A discusses cases arising before the 2014 midterms, Section B
discusses cases arising between 2016 and 2018, and Section C discusses cases
arising before the 2020 election.
A. The Beginnings of the Doctrine: 2014 Midterms
The Supreme Court first applied the Purcell Principle in the run-up to the 2014
midterm election.60 Around a month before the election, the Court issued four orders
without explanation.
First was Veasey v. Perry.61 There, the Court allowed Texas’s voter
identification restrictions to stand. It did so by refusing to vacate a Fifth Circuit stay
on a district court order that had enjoined the restrictions.62 The majority did not
issue an opinion, but Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan noted their dissent.63
The dissent first criticized the Fifth Circuit for treating Purcell as a bright-line rule
rather than applying the four stay factors.64 It then criticized the majority, arguing
that Purcell does not prevent the Court from vacating the stay in this case because
no confusion would result from its doing so.65 That was because the state could
merely reinstate the procedures it used for ten years, including in the last five general
elections.66 By contrast, the rule that the district court struck down had only been
used for three “low-participation” statewide elections, so there was “little risk” that
doing away with it would disrupt the election.67 The dissent also pointed out that the
state had almost an entire year since the case began to prepare for the possibility of
the district court’s injunction and any confusion that would result from it.68 The
dissent, unlike the majority, thus understood Purcell as one factor in the analysis,
not as a total prohibition on judicial intervention.69
In Frank v. Walker,70 the Court took a different approach. The district court
enjoined Wisconsin’s voter identification requirements, and the Seventh Circuit
stayed that order—but this time, the Court vacated the Seventh Circuit’s stay,
allowing the district court’s injunction to stand.71 The majority again did not write
60

It is also from these cases that Richard L. Hasen first developed the Purcell Principle.
See Hasen, supra note 2.
61
135 S. Ct. 9 (2014) (mem.).
62
Id. at 9–10.
63
Id. at 10–12 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
64
Id. at 10 (citing Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006)).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. (“Purcell held only that courts must take careful account of considerations specific
to election cases, not that election cases are exempt from traditional stay standards.”
(citations omitted)).
70
135 S. Ct. 7 (2014) (mem.).
71
Id. The Supreme Court later denied certiorari when the full case came back up on the
merits. See Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015) (mem.).
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an opinion, but Judge Williams’s dissent at the Seventh Circuit offers some clues as
to what the majority might have been thinking.72 It argued that Purcell counsels
against the last-minute stay because the district court order at issue had been in place
for nearly five months.73 Accordingly, that order was the status quo that Wisconsin
voters had come to rely on, and the Seventh Circuit’s stay—which came so close to
the election that absentee voting was already underway—disrupted that status quo.74
Judge Williams also believed that plaintiffs had a strong likelihood of success on the
merits, as the law potentially disenfranchised ten percent of registered, not just
eligible, voters in Wisconsin.75 And the state would not suffer irreparable harm from
the injunction because it could not point to a single instance of voter fraud in its
elections that this law would have prevented.76 At the Supreme Court, Justices Alito,
Scalia, and Thomas dissented.77 While the dissent acknowledged that there was a
“colorable basis” for the majority’s decision because of the “proximity of the
upcoming . . . election,” it ultimately believed that the Seventh Circuit’s decision
could not be overturned because it did not “demonstrably” err in issuing a stay.78
In North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of North Carolina,79 the Court
once again allowed restrictions on voting to stand. The district court refused to
enjoin a North Carolina law that eliminated same-day voter registration and the
counting of votes cast at the wrong precinct, but the Fourth Circuit remanded the
case to the district court with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction.80 The
Supreme Court, however, vacated that Fourth Circuit order, which allowed the
restrictions to stand; Justices Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented on
grounds that she would not displace the Fourth Circuit’s “record-based reasoned
judgment” that the law violated the Voting Rights Act.81
Lastly, in Husted v. Ohio NAACP,82 the Court allowed Ohio to shorten its early
voting period from thirty-five days to twenty-eight days, and allowed the state to
eliminate its “Golden Week,” a week in which voters could register and vote in the
same transaction.83 The district court enjoined the state, but the Supreme Court
72

See Frank v. Walker, 769 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2014) (Williams, J., dissenting).
Id. at 499, 501. The Seventh Circuit’s stay came on September 26, 2014, while the
district court’s injunction came much earlier, on April 29, 2014. Id. at 494–95 (per curiam).
Professor Hasen similarly theorized that this case came out differently to Veasey because,
unlike in Veasey, the voter identification law here had not previously been in place for an
election. See Hasen, supra note 14.
74
Id. at 498–501 (Williams, J., dissenting) (discussing the status quo).
75
Id. at 498.
76
Id. at 500–01.
77
Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting).
78
Id. at 7.
79
135 S. Ct. 6 (2014) (mem.).
80
League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 230, 248 (4th
Cir. 2014).
81
League of Women Voters of N.C., 135 S. Ct. at 6–7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
82
135 S. Ct. 42 (2014) (mem.).
83
Cf. Ohio State Conf. of NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808, 812 (S.D. Ohio 2014).
73
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stayed the district court’s order, allowing Ohio’s cutback to stand.84 Justices
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Breyer dissented, again without explanation.85
After Purcell’s first big outing, the results were inconsistent. The Court upheld
voting restrictions in three out of four cases, upheld circuit courts in two out of the
three cases heard by a circuit court, and agreed with the district court in two out of
four cases. In one case, all four liberals dissented; in another, Justice Breyer did not
join the dissent; in still another, both Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan did not join
the dissent.86 In the one case in which conservative Justices dissented, Justices
Roberts and Kennedy did not join, despite seemingly voting with their conservative
colleagues in every other case. This trend of inconsistency continued in subsequent
years.
B. The Calm Before the Storm: 2016 to 2018
The Court decided only two emergency election cases that implicated Purcell
in 2016—both without explanation. In North Carolina v. North Carolina State
Conference of NAACP,87 the Court refused to vacate a Fourth Circuit decision that
enjoined North Carolina restrictions, including voter identification requirements,
changes to early voting, and a pre-registration provision.88 Justices Roberts,
Kennedy, and Alito would have granted the stay excepting the pre-registration
provision, which allowed sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds to register to vote when
applying for driver’s licenses, while Justice Thomas would have granted the stay in
its entirety.89 In another North Carolina case, McCrory v. Harris, the Court refused
to stay a district court order requiring the state to redraw its congressional districts
in just two weeks and in a way that did not amount to a racial gerrymander under

84

The case was appealed directly from the district court to the Supreme Court, so there
was no circuit court decision. Ohio State Conf. of NAACP, 135 S. Ct. at 42.
85
Id. The Justices only noted that they would have denied the application for stay and
did not offer a written explanation of their dissent.
86
This Article refers to Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Breyer as the “liberal
Justices” and to Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, Alito, and Gorsuch as the “conservative
Justices.” See Oriana Gonzalez & Danielle Alberti, The Political Leanings of the Supreme
Court Justices, AXIOS, https://www.axios.com/supreme-court-Justices-ideology-52ed3cadfcff-4467-a336-8bec2e6e36d4.html [https://perma.cc/3QWG-UKLA] (last visited July 5,
2022); see also Andrew D. Martin, & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134,
146 (2002) (calculating ideology scores for each justice).
87
137 S. Ct. 27 (2016) (mem.).
88
Id.; N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 217 (4th Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 27 (2016) (“Preregistration permitted 16- and 17-year-olds, . . . to identify
themselves and indicate their intent to vote. . . . This allowed County Boards of Elections to
verify eligibility and automatically register eligible citizens once they reached eighteen.”).
89
N.C. State Conf. of NAACP, 137 S. Ct. at 28.
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the Equal Protection Clause.90 The Court’s order came after absentee voting started
and featured no noted dissents.91 Some questioned whether this case—which
allowed a district court to intervene in a major way close to an election—marked the
end of the Purcell Principle.92
In 2018, however, the Court confirmed that the Purcell Principle was alive and
well. First, in Brakebill v. Jaeger, the Court allowed North Dakota to require voter
identification with a residential street address.93 North Dakota has a large Native
American population, and many Native Americans lack a residential address
because they live on reservations or in rural areas.94 A survey submitted to the
district court found that 19% of otherwise eligible Native American voters in North
Dakota lacked qualifying identification under the law, as compared with 11.6% of
non-native eligible voters.95 Accordingly, the district court enjoined the state law,
finding it unconstitutionally burdened the right to vote, and required the state to
accept identification with a residential address or a mailing address.96 The Eighth
Circuit stayed the district court’s order, and the Supreme Court refused to vacate the
Eighth Circuit’s stay, leaving the restriction in place. Justices Ginsburg and Kagan
dissented. They argued that because the district court injunction was in place for the
primary election and because the Secretary of State’s website listed the identification
requirements based on the order, the order became the status quo, and the Eighth
Circuit disrupted that status quo by vacating the injunction.97 The dissent
acknowledged that if the Court were to overturn the Eighth Circuit’s stay, then the
Court’s own order would also disrupt the status quo.98 But it argued the confusion
90

McCrory v. Harris, 136 S. Ct. 1001 (2016) (mem.). A few hours before the Supreme
Court’s order, North Carolina did, however, notify the Court that it had created a new
redistricting plan. See Hasen, supra note 14.
91
McCroy, 136 S.Ct. at 1001; Hasen, supra note 14. Recall that, under the shadow
docket’s obscure procedures, some Justices could have disagreed with the outcome but failed
to note their disagreement. See supra notes 10–15 and accompanying text.
92
See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 14 (positing reasons for the Court’s seeming change of
heart).
93
139 S. Ct. 10 (2018) (mem.).
94
See Matt Vasilogambros, For Some Native Americans, No Home Address Might
Mean No Voting, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/
research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2019/10/04/for-some-native-americans-no-homeaddress-might-mean-no-voting [https://perma.cc/KNC2-EKD8].
95
Brakebill v. Jaeger, No. 1:16-CV-008, 2018 WL 1612190, at *2 (D.N.D. Apr. 3,
2018) (“The difference is statistically significant at the 99 percent level, the most rigorous
level of social science testing.”), vacated and remanded, 932 F.3d 671 (8th Cir. 2019).
96
Brakebill, 2018 WL at *7.
97
Brakebill, 139 S. Ct. at 10 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The risk of voter
confusion appears severe here because the injunction against requiring residential-address
identification was in force during the primary election and because the Secretary of State’s
website announced for months the ID requirements as they existed under that injunction.
Reasonable voters may well assume that the IDs allowing them to vote in the primary
election would remain valid in the general election.”).
98
Id.
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from leaving the Eighth Circuit’s order in place would be far worse.99 This is because
if the Supreme Court were to reinstate the district court order, which broadened the
types of acceptable identifications, the worst that could result from any confusion is
a voter showing up at the polls with more detailed identification than necessary.100
The Eighth Circuit’s order, by contrast, narrowed the list of acceptable
identifications, so it might cause voters to turn up at the polls to discover that their
previously valid identification is now invalid.101
Second, in Michigan State A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Johnson,102 the Court
refused to vacate a Sixth Circuit stay. The Court’s order, which contained no
opinion, had the effect of upholding a Michigan statute that eliminated its “straight
ticket” voting procedure—a procedure that allowed voters to select a party’s entire
slate of candidates by checking one box.103 Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor noted
that they would have vacated the stay but did not provide an opinion explaining
why.104
C. The Storm: 2020
In part because of the COVID-19 pandemic, 2020 featured a flurry of
emergency election cases in the Supreme Court. The conservative majority doubled
down on its treatment of Purcell as a potentially absolute bar to judicial intervention,
and consequently, most holdings resulted in the reinstatement of voting restrictions.
What made 2020 stand out, however, was the way in which the Court did so. Perhaps
attuned to mounting criticism or the high-stakes nature of election litigation in the
2020 election cycle, the Justices broke from the norm and explained their reasoning
at length in several cases.105 These opinions shed the most light to date on the Purcell
Principle. They also evidence a growing rift between the conservative and liberal
Justices: the conservative Justices interpret Purcell as a bright-line bar on judicial
intervention close to an election, or something close to it, and the liberal Justices
99

Id.
Id. at 10–11 (“[T]he confusion arising from vacating the stay would at most lead to
voters securing an additional form of ID.”).
101
Id. at 11.
102
139 S. Ct. 50 (2018) (mem.).
103
The district court found that, among other things, the elimination of straight ticket
voting would disproportionately lead to longer lines for African Americans and deter African
Americans from voting. See Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson, 326 F. Supp.
3d 532, 555–78 (E.D. Mich. 2018).
104
Johnson, 139 S. Ct. 50.
105
In Democratic National Committee v. Wisconsin State Legislature, for instance,
Justice Roberts wrote separately to explain why his vote was not inconsistent with his votes
in previous cases. 141 S. Ct. 28 (2020) (mem.). See also @steven_vladeck, TWITTER (Oct.
26, 2020, 6:45 PM ), https://twitter.com/steve_vladeck/status/1320874207560011783?s=20
[https://perma.cc/6XGC-2N7Z] (“Perhaps mindful of the mounting criticism of such
‘shadow docket’ rulings without any reasoning, six of the eight Justices . . . signed onto
opinions setting out their reasons for refusing to lift the Seventh Circuit’s stay.”).
100
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interpret Purcell as an invitation to inquire into whether such intervention will cause
confusion in the case at hand.
In Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee (RNC v.
DNC), a per curiam majority stayed a district court order that had extended the
Wisconsin primary mail-in ballot deadline.106 State law required mail-in ballots to
be postmarked and received by election day, April 7, 2020 but the district court ruled
that ballots must still be counted as long as they were received by April 13, 2020.107
It did so because the state received an influx of mail-in ballot requests during the
COVID-19 pandemic and could not distribute ballots in time.108 Even voters who
requested their ballots by the proper deadline would be unable to return their ballots
on time—which, according to the district court, rendered the April 7 deadline an
unconstitutional burden on the right to vote.109 The Supreme Court, seemingly
applying Purcell as a bright-line rule, held that “[b]y changing the election rules so
close to the election date . . . the District Court contravened this Court’s precedents
and erred by ordering such relief.”110 The dissent, however, stressed that tens of
thousands of voters—who followed all of the state’s rules—would be
disenfranchised if the district court could not alter the rules in these unusual times.111
As to Purcell, the dissent suggested that the district court order, not the state law,
was the status quo that the Court should protect. In its eyes, it was illogical for the
majority to uphold a stay on the district court order on the grounds that the order
would create confusion because of its proximity to the election when the majority’s
order changed the rules one day before the election.112
Next, in Andino v. Middleton, the Court reinstated South Carolina’s witness
signature requirement.113 A district court enjoined South Carolina from requiring
that mail-in ballots be signed by a witness, finding the requirement was an
106

140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020) (per curiam).
Id. at 1206–07.
108
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F.Supp.3d 952, 976 (W.D. Wisc.
2020).
109
Democratic Nat’l Comm. 140 S. Ct. at 1209 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
110
Id. at 1207 (per curiam). In addition, the district court enjoined the release of election
results until April 13, 2020 in case the results affected still ongoing voting. According to the
majority, the fact that the district court needed to issue a subsequent injunction to avoid voter
confusion caused by its first injunction “further underscore[d] the wisdom of the Purcell
principle[.]” Id.
111
Id. at 1209 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
112
Id. at 1210–11 (“[T]he Court’s order cites Purcell, apparently skeptical of the
District Court’s intervention shortly before an election. Nevermind that the District Court
was reacting to a grave, rapidly developing public health crisis. If proximity to the election
counseled hesitation when the District Court acted several days ago, this Court’s intervention
today—even closer to the election—is all the more inappropriate.”). The majority responded
that it would “prefer not to” intervene so late but maintained that “when a lower court
intervenes and alters the election rules so close to the election date, [the Court’s] precedents
indicate that [the] Court . . . should correct that error.” Id. at 1207 (per curiam).
113
141 S. Ct. 9 (2020) (mem.) (exempting ballots already sent and received within two
days of the Supreme Court’s order).
107
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unconstitutional burden on the right to vote because it required voters to risk
contracting COVID-19.114 The Supreme Court stayed the order but exempted ballots
already sent before the stay and received within two days of it.115 Justices Thomas,
Gorsuch, and Alito noted that they would have stayed the order in full.116 Justice
Kavanaugh wrote separately to emphasize that it is the job of the state legislature,
not the court, to make election rules.117 He also cited Purcell, seeming to understand
it as a bright-line time bar, as he simply noted that the district court ran afoul of the
principle by acting close to an election.118 Curiously, he wrote that he concurred for
“two alternative and independent reasons,”119 which, taken literally, would suggest
that the majority did not share his views on the Purcell Principle. But this is likely
just a formalism, as he has used this language elsewhere when he agrees with other
opinions.120 None of the liberal Justices noted their dissent. While it is clear from
their previous opinions that they disagree with Justice Kavanaugh’s characterization
and application of the Purcell Principle, it is possible that they believed other factors
outweighed Purcell.121
There were four separate opinions in Democratic National Committee v.
Wisconsin State Legislature (DNC v. Wisconsin),122 a case with similar facts to RNC
v. DNC but implicating the general election. Once again, the Court prevented the
district court from extending the absentee ballot deadline.123 First, Chief Justice
Roberts wrote to clarify why his vote to strike down the extension here was not
inconsistent with his vote to uphold a similar extension in two recent Pennsylvania
cases.124 According to Chief Justice Roberts, the Pennsylvania cases were
distinguishable because they involved a state court applying its own constitution,
while here, a federal court intruded on the state lawmaking process.125

114

Middleton v. Andino, 488 F. Supp. 3d 261, 296 (D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2020).
Andino, 141 S. Ct. at 9–10.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 10 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)
118
Id. (“[T]his Court has repeatedly emphasized that federal courts ordinarily should
not alter state election rules in the period close to an election. By enjoining South Carolina’s
witness requirement shortly before the election, the District Court defied that principle and
this Court’s precedents.” (citations omitted)).
119
Id.
120
See, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 30, 32
(2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (concurring “[f]or three alternative and independent
reasons,” despite the fact that one of those reasons was the independent state legislature
doctrine, something Justice Gorsuch also stated in his concurrence, which Justice Kavanaugh
joined).
121
For example, the liberal Justices might have believed that the injunction had a weak
likelihood of success on the merits. See supra Part I.A.
122
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 28 (2020) (mem.).
123
Id. at 28 (refusing to vacate a Seventh Circuit stay of the order).
124
See generally Republican Party of Pa. v. Boockvar 141 S. Ct. 1 (2020); Scarnati v.
Boockvar, 141 S. Ct. 644 (2020) (mem.).
125
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. at 28 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
115
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Second, Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Kavanaugh, seemed to endorse a
version of the controversial “independent state legislature” doctrine.126 The doctrine
argues that because the Constitution vests state legislatures with the power to
regulate federal elections, state courts cannot restrict the authority of state
legislatures to craft election procedures, even by enforcing the state constitution.127
The Court rejected the doctrine in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission, but only by a 5–4 vote, so it may soon be subject to
reexamination.128
Third, Justice Kavanaugh wrote that the Court should not intervene at this late
hour.129 Rather than treating the Purcell Principle as one consideration in the
decision or an invitation to inquire into whether the order will create confusion,
Justice Kavanaugh suggested that he interprets the principle as a bright-line bar to
judicial interference. According to him, “[t]he Court’s precedents recognize a basic
tenet of election law: When an election is close at hand, the rules of the road should
be clear and settled.”130 Nowhere in his opinion did Justice Kavanaugh analyze
whether the district court’s order would cause confusion. Instead, it was enough that
the district court altered the rules “too close” to the election.131
Fourth, in dissent, Justice Kagan challenged the premises underlying the two
previous ideas. In response to the independent state legislature doctrine, she argued
that while the state may possess the power to make election rules, such a delegation
does not remove from the judiciary the power to determine whether those rules are
constitutional or not.132 In response to Justice Kavanaugh, she explained that
“fixating on time alone” is a “misunderstanding of Purcell’s message.”133 The proper
126

Id. at 29 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“The Constitution provides that state
legislatures—not federal judges, not state judges, not state governors, not other state
officials—bear the primary responsibility for setting election rules.”). The Seventh Circuit
did so, too. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 977 F. 3d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 2020)
(“[T]he design of electoral procedures is a legislative task.”).
127
See Michael T. Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal
Elections, and State Constitutions, 55 GA. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2020).
128
576 U.S. 787, 816–19 (2015). See also Morley, supra note 127, at 10–11. Justice
Thomas has also endorsed the doctrine. See Republican Party of Pa. v. Degraffenreid, 141 S.
Ct. 732, 732–38 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Court is set to hear arguments on the
doctrine, likely in fall of 2022. See Amy Howe, Justices Will Hear Case that Tests Power of
State Legislatures to Set Rules for Federal Elections, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 2022, 12:47
PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2022/06/justices-will-hear-case-that-tests-power-ofstate-legislatures-to-set-rules-for-federal-elections/ [https://perma.cc/2C5S-GSWG].
129
See Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S.Ct at 30–32 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
130
Id. at 31.
131
Id. at 34 (“In sum, the District Court’s injunction was unwarranted for three
alternative and independent reasons,” one of which was that “[t]he District Court changed
the state election laws too close to the election.”).
132
Id. at 43 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[Some have] argued that the design of electoral
procedures is a solely legislative task. But that is not so when those procedures infringe the
constitutionally enshrined right to vote.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
133
Id. at 41 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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inquiry considers all relevant factors—including whether the order will confuse
voters—not merely whether the order will come close to the election.134 For support,
Justice Kagan pointed back to the text of Purcell, which explained that a court should
“weigh” whether to issue an injunction by balancing “the harms attendant upon
issuance or noninssuance of an injunction,” with “considerations specific to election
cases,” including voter confusion.135 As Judge Rover said in dissent below, these
words “articulated not a rule but a caution . . . .”136 Otherwise, Purcell would place
a “moratorium on the Constitution as the cold weather approaches.”137 Indeed,
Justice Kagan and the liberal Justices believe that when last-minute changes confuse
voters, courts should think twice before intervention. But they also believe that “not
every such change poses that danger” and that courts “must also take account of
other matters,” not just the calendar, in deciding whether to issue an injunction.138
In this case, Justice Kagan argued, the district court’s order was unlikely to confuse
voters because a voter who was unaware of the district court’s late extension of the
deadline would, at worst, mail in their ballot earlier than necessary.139
Next, in Merrill v. People First of Alabama, the Court stayed a district court
order that aimed to make it easier for high-risk individuals to vote during the
COVID-19 pandemic.140 The district court’s order enjoined the Alabama Secretary
of State’s ban on curbside voting, holding that the ban violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act because it forced disabled voters, who are disproportionately more
susceptible to the virus, to vote in person.141 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit upheld
the injunction.142 Without an opinion, the Supreme Court’s conservative majority
reinstated that ban. Justices Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan dissented.143 They
emphasized that the injunction would not create voter confusion because it did not
require all counties to adopt curbside voting but instead gave counties the option to
do so.144 Although the majority did not author an opinion, one of two responses can
be inferred. First, it might believe that, despite the fact the election administrators
had a choice of whether to adopt curbside voting, voter confusion would still result.
134

Id. at 41–42 (“At its core, Purcell tells courts to apply, not depart from, the usual
rules of equity.”).
135
Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006).
136
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 977 F. 3d 639, 644 (2020) (Rovner, J.,
dissenting).
137
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. at 42 (2020) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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Id.
139
Id.
140
141 S. Ct. 25 (2020) (mem.).
141
The district court also held that the ban infringed on the plaintiffs’ right to vote but
the Supreme Court did not address this issue. The majority did not write an opinion and the
dissent chose not to because it believed the injunction was appropriate under the Americans
with Disabilities Act. Id at 26 n.1.
142
People First of Ala. v. Sec’y of State for Ala., 2020 WL 6074333, at *1 (11th Cir.
Oct. 13, 2020) (granting a motion for stay as to the witness and photo identification
requirements but denying as to the curbside voting ban).
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Merrill, 141 S. Ct. at 26 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 27.
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This would be strange, given that election administrators are presumably better
positioned than the Court to predict voter confusion on the ground. Or second, it
might understand the Purcell Principle to be a bright-line rule barring judicial
intervention close to an election, no matter how likely the order is to confuse voters
and election administrators.
Lastly, in Raysor v. DeSantis,145 the Court allowed Florida’s felony voting
restrictions to stand. In 2018, Florida voters approved an amendment that allowed
those with felony convictions to vote once they completed “all terms” of their
sentence.146 In 2019, however, the state legislature passed a law defining “all terms”
of a sentence to include the payment of all court fees, not just the completion of a
sentence.147 In October 2019, a district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of
the statute, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed (“Jones I”).148 The district court then
ruled on the plaintiffs’ motion for a permanent injunction. On May 24, 2020, it
permanently enjoined enforcement of the law, holding that the scheme violates the
Fifth Amendment, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, and the Fourteenth
Amendment.149 Just nineteen days before the voter-registration deadline, and
without explanation, the Eleventh Circuit stayed the injunction until it could
consider the full appeal (“Jones II”).150 The plaintiffs asked the Supreme Court to
vacate the stay in time for the August primary, but the Court, also without an
opinion, refused to do so.151 Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Kagan, dissented with an opinion—one that repeatedly emphasized Purcell.152
To the dissent, the irreparable harm was clear: more than a million voters would
be disenfranchised.153 As to Purcell, the Eleventh Circuit “created the very
‘confusion’ and voter chill that Purcell counsels courts to avoid” because its stay
upended the status quo that stood for nearly a year while the preliminary injunction
from Jones I was in place.154 The dissent also objected to the Eleventh Circuit’s
failure to vacate Jones I (the case in which it affirmed the district court’s preliminary
injunction) when it stayed the order in Jones II. Because of Jones I, the dissent
reasoned, tens of thousands of voters with prior felony convictions no doubt
registered to vote after the decision.155 But the Eleventh Circuit failed to vacate Jones
I, so those voters remained on the voter rolls.156 Now, after Jones II (renamed Raysor
v. DeSantis on appeal at the Supreme Court), those who registered relying on Jones
I would not be notified of their ineligibility or of the criminal liability they risked
145
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should they vote.157 And the dissent did not stop there. In a striking rebuke, the
liberal Justices showed their frustration with the conservative Justices’ handling of
the Purcell doctrine:
This Court’s inaction continues a trend of condoning disfranchisement.
Ironically, this Court has wielded Purcell as a reason to forbid courts to
make voting safer during a pandemic, overriding two federal courts
because any safety-related changes supposedly came too close to election
day. Now, faced with an appellate court stay that disrupts a legal status
quo and risks immense disfranchisement—a situation that Purcell sought
to avoid—the Court balks.158
D. The Aftermath: 2022
After a brief period of dormancy, Purcell again cropped up in 2022. So far, the
Supreme Court has twice applied Purcell to a relatively unfamiliar context:
redistricting.
Merrill v. Milligan159 signaled that significant changes to Purcell are afoot.
Without an opinion, the majority stayed a decision by a three-judge court that had
ruled Alabama’s congressional map unconstitutional.160 Justice Kavanaugh, joined
by Justice Alito, wrote separately and made two points. First, the concurrence
expressed the novel view that Purcell modifies the preliminary injunction factors in
a way that makes it harder for plaintiffs to obtain injunctions. To Justice Kavanaugh,
the Purcell Principle can be overcome when: “(i) the underlying merits are entirely
clearcut in favor of the plaintiff; (ii) the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm
absent the injunction; (iii) the plaintiff has not unduly delayed bringing the
complaint to court; and (iv) the changes in question are at least feasible before the
election without significant cost, confusion, or hardship.”161 Second, the
concurrence emphasized that Purcell kicks in sooner in gerrymandering cases; here,
seven weeks away from the start of absentee voting was sufficiently “close” for
Purcell to apply because redrawing congressional districts would create “chaos.”162
Not only would redrawing the map take time, the concurrence explained, but
candidates would not know which districts to file in, incumbents would not know
whether they would be running against other incumbents, and voters would not
know who their choices would be.163
The dissent did not address the concurrence’s attempt at retooling the injunction
factors. Instead, Justice Kagan—joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor—simply
157
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Id. at 2603 (citations omitted). The second court the dissent is referring to is the
district court in RNC v. DNC.
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disagreed that the case came close enough to an election for Purcell to apply.164
Justice Kagan emphasized that the election was not mere weeks away: the primary
was four months away, the general election was nine months away, and the state had
the authority to delay the start of absentee voting.165 And, Justice Kagan added, the
plaintiffs brought their lawsuit within hours or days of Alabama’s new map coming
into effect, the district court expedited the proceedings, and the only delay came
because of the state.166 Because the Court had before denied stays of districting
orders this far out from an election—including in McCrory v. Harris—the dissent
saw no reason to do otherwise here.167
In contrast, the Court next refused to block orders that required Republicancontrolled state legislatures to use new maps. In Moore v. Harper,168 the plaintiffs
asked the Court to reinstate the state legislature’s map after the North Carolina
Supreme Court invalidated it and required that the state use a map created by courtappointed experts.169 Without explanation, the Court refused to stay the order.170
This time, the majority was seemingly comprised of the dissenting Justices in
Merrill, Justice Barrett, Justice Roberts, and Justice Kavanaugh. Again, Justice
Kavanaugh wrote separately to emphasize that, like Merrill, this case came too close
to an election for the Court to intervene.171 But he did not explain why the state
court’s order—which put in place a new map a little over a week before candidates
had to file for the primary and just over a month before absentee ballots were set to
go out—would not create the “chaos” he warned of in Merrill.172
Both cases suggest that the redistricting context can expand the Purcell
Principle’s reach. Redrawing congressional maps threatens to create confusion
earlier in the election cycle than other changes. For example, changes to voter
identification, mail-in voting, or ballot drop boxes all risk causing confusion at the
time of voting. But redistricting does not just affect voters at the time of voting; it
also affects how well a candidate can campaign to voters in the lead-up to an
election.173 Redistricting cases may therefore justify invoking the Purcell Principle
further away from elections. This, coupled with the view that Purcell should apply
any time an election is sufficiently close, could create a principle that is far more
intrusive than the one the Court envisaged in Purcell.
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In sum, the Court’s Purcell jurisprudence is at a crossroads. One group of
Justices understands Purcell as a bright-line-timing rule—or something close to it.
The other group of Justices considers Purcell in light of a host of factors that seek
to identify whether the harms Purcell counsels against are present in the case at
hand.
III. THE STATUS QUO AND THE POSITIVE-NEGATIVE DISTINCTION
This Part identifies two features of the case law that have yet to be recognized
by scholars: (i) the “status quo” and (ii) the distinction between “positive” and
“negative” orders. First, the Court appears to begin its inquiry by identifying a
“status quo”—an existing set of election procedures. The Justices, however, do not
agree on a baseline by which to measure the status quo. Second, there are two main
types of order in a Purcell case, which this Article taxonomizes as “positive” and
“negative.” Without saying so explicitly, the conservative and liberal Justices appear
to disagree on whether negative orders can ever trigger the Purcell Principle. Both
issues are undertheorized in the literature and undeveloped by courts. Accordingly,
this Part offers a descriptive contribution by bringing them out from the shadows
and discussing the qualities they bring to bear on Purcell cases. This Part also offers
a normative contribution by arguing that the status quo is ultimately misplaced in,
and distorts, a Purcell analysis.
In response to the first feature, Section A discusses the hidden “step zero” in
the Purcell analysis before ultimately rejecting its use as inconsistent with Purcell.
In response to the second feature, Section B identifies the two main types of order
found in the Purcell case law and assigns them to a framework that denotes them as
either “positive” or “negative” orders based on whether they add or remove voting
restrictions.
A. Status Quo
Courts sometimes ask a threshold question when considering the Purcell
Principle: which status quo applies?174 The immediate problem with such a question
is that it is not always clear what the rules are to begin with. But the bigger problem
is that focusing on the status quo distorts the Purcell inquiry, taking it away from its
intended use. Despite this, the status quo has largely taken a back seat in the
scholarly discussion.175 Because this threshold inquiry often influences the rest of a
Purcell Principle analysis, this Article seeks to bring it out from the shadows and
place it at the forefront of any discussion about Purcell.
174

See, e.g., Raysor v. DeSantis, 140 S. Ct. 2600, 2603 (2020) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting); Frank v. Walker, 769 F.3d 494, 499 (7th Cir. 2014) (Williams, J., dissenting).
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The exception is Professor Muller, who first identified this point. See Derek T.
Muller, Justice Ginsburg Turns the “Purcell Principle” Upside Down in Wisconsin Primary
Case, EXCESS OF DEMOCRACY (April 6, 2020), https://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2020/
4/justice-ginsburg-turns-the-purcell-principle-upside-down-in-wisconsin-primary-case
[https://perma.cc/2Q3B-9E9X].
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Section A.1 explains how the status quo became a central feature of Purcell
case law, operating as a hidden “step zero” in the analysis. It also discusses the
importance of this inquiry, which is sometimes even outcome determinative, to the
analysis and common scenarios in which it arises. Section A.2 identifies various
methods of identifying the status quo and the benefits of each. Lastly, Section A.3
concludes that the idea that courts must—or even can—identify a status quo at all is
misguided. In other words, it argues that there should be no “step zero” in a Purcell
inquiry.
1. Purcell “Step Zero”
A hidden “step zero” has crept into Purcell Principle doctrine.176 In “step zero,”
the Court first identifies a set of election procedures that they believe the public is
used to—the status quo—and then measures voter confusion by how much the
district court’s injunction departs from those norms. And this makes intuitive sense.
At its heart, Purcell is about a court changing the rules of the game, so it is logical
to begin the inquiry by asking what the rules of the game are and how much they
have been changed. After all, if the district court order is not disrupting the status
quo, then it cannot confuse voters. For instance, Justice Sotomayor recently
described Purcell as something that sought to avoid “disrupt[ing] a legal status
quo.”177 Likewise, lower courts seem to have taken a similar interpretation. The Fifth
Circuit, for instance, understood Purcell in the following way: “The Supreme Court
has repeatedly instructed courts to carefully consider the importance of preserving
the status quo on the eve of an election.”178
Likewise, when Frank v. Walker was at the Seventh Circuit, after recounting
what the Supreme Court did in Purcell, Judge Williams declared, “[h]ere too, the
status quo . . . should be restored.”179 Yet nowhere was the phrase “status quo”
mentioned or even alluded to in Purcell—the opinion mentioned only preventing
confusion and the resulting voter chill. The idea likely crept into the doctrine because
Nken, the case that established the stay standard, described a stay as something that
“suspend[s] judicial alteration of the status quo.”180 But, as discussed in the next
subsection, equating Purcell with this language is a mistake.
We can most clearly see “step zero” at work in cases like Brakebill and RNC,181
in which something counterintuitive happens: the majority and dissent both agree
that Purcell controls the outcome but reach different outcomes based on their
applications. They do so because they identify different status quos. In other cases,
176

Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,
836 (2001) (coining Chevron “step zero”).
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Raysor, 140 S. Ct. at 2603.
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Veasey v. Perry, 769 F.3d 890, 892 (5th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added).
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Walker, 769 F.3d at 499 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 429 (2009) (quoting Ohio Citizens for Responsible
Energy, Inc. v. NRC, 479 U.S. 1312, 1313 (2009) (Scalia, J., in chambers)).
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Brakebill v. Jaeger, 139 S. Ct. 10 (2018) (mem.); Republican Nat’l Comm. v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020) (per curiam). See supra Part II.
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where the baseline voting procedure is uncontested, a “step zero” analysis does not
appear in the opinions—much like how Chevron “step zero” is only implicated in
cases when it is unclear whether the agency acted with the force of law.182 In cases
in which “step zero” is implicated, debates over the status quo typically arise in two
situations.
First, a district court injunction may be in effect for so long that it arguably
becomes the status quo. Take Brakebill v. Jaeger, for example. To the majority, the
state law was the status quo, so the district court’s order disrupted the status quo.183
But to the dissent, the district court’s order was the status quo because it was in place
for the most recent primary, meaning it was what voters and election administrators
were most familiar with. And the appellate stay of the injunction disrupted that status
quo.184 Similarly, in Raysor v. DeSantis, the dissent argued that the preliminary
injunction—which had been in place for a year before the Court’s decision—was
the status quo rather than the state law it enjoined.185
Second, the Supreme Court’s order or a circuit court’s order itself may disrupt
the status quo. One example is RNC v. DNC.186 There the per curiam majority
approached the problem formalistically: the deadline set by state law was the status
quo, and the district court’s order changed that deadline, so Purcell counseled
against the change.187 Yet the Supreme Court’s decision came on April 6—one day
before the election. Is there not a hint of hypocrisy in the Supreme Court
reprimanding a district court for “alter[ing] the election rules on the eve of an
election,” and then providing relief by itself altering the election rules on the actual
eve of an election?188 Justice Ginsburg thought so. Joined by the other three liberal
Justices, she argued that the status quo was the district court order, not the state
law.189 Not only did the majority’s order require voters to postmark their ballots by
April 7 even if they had not received their ballots by April, which would, of course,
disenfranchise some voters,190 but election officials informed voters of the new
182

See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 176, at 836.
Brakebill, 139 S. Ct. at 10 (2018) (mem.). This is, at least, what we can read into the
majority’s order based on the context and based on the dissent. The majority provided no
written opinion in this case.
184
Id. at 10–11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Rayson v. DeSantis, 140 S. Ct. 2600, 2603 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020) (per curiam) (staying a district court order that had extended
Wisconsin’s mail-in ballot deadline). Another is Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence in DNC
v. Wisconsin State Legislature. See 141 S. Ct. 28, 31–32 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
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Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020)
(per curiam) (“By changing the election rules so close to the election date . . . the District
Court contravened this Court’s precedents and erred by ordering such relief. This Court has
repeatedly emphasized that lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules
on the eve of an election.”).
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Id.
189
Id. at 1208–11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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ballot she has not received.”).
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deadline and created compliance procedures in the days following the district court
order.191 The majority’s intervention would thus confuse voters and election
officials.192 According to the dissent, “[i]f proximity to the election counseled
hesitation when the District Court acted several days ago, this Court’s intervention
today—even closer to the election—is all the more inappropriate.”193
2. Identifying the Status Quo
The Justices arrive at such different conclusions about what the status quo is
because they measure the status quo in different ways. Broadly speaking, two
methods of framing the status quo have emerged in the case law: (i) the “state law”
frame and (ii) the “recency” frame. Each comes with distinct policy benefits, but, as
the next subsection shows, each is also ultimately a misunderstanding of Purcell.
First, the “state law” frame views state law as the status quo. This approach
assumes that public knowledge about voting procedures derives from state
legislation. In doing so, it assumes an entirely informed voter—or at least entirely
informed as to the state law—who will become confused if voting procedures differ
from the procedures listed in the state code. This approach seems to be the viewpoint
of the majorities in RNC and Brakebill.194
The state law frame’s biggest benefit is its ability to foster doctrinal
development. The state law frame ignores the confusion caused by appellate
decisions, and by taking this longer-term approach to the status quo, the Court can
consider not just the case at hand but the doctrine as a whole. While a few appellate
decisions might, in reality, cause some immediate confusion, that confusion might
be justified because appellate decisions provide guidance for the doctrine as a whole,
creating a clearer rule for later district court decisions. Under this rationale,
confusion from appellate review is a necessary growing pain in forming a coherent
doctrine. To be sure, appellate review is at best a necessary condition to a coherent
doctrine, not a sufficient condition—after all, Purcell was decided in 2006, and we
are still dealing with its doctrinal issues today.
Second, the “recency frame” understands the status quo in terms of the rule that
was predominantly in place for some period leading up to the current election. This
period could be weeks, months, or years—whatever period is necessary for the court
to declare that a certain rule is what a voter will expect when she arrives at the polls
because of some sort of recency bias. The rule could be either a state law or a district
court order—or even a rule promulgated in some other way, such as an executive
order. This approach seems to be the viewpoint of the liberal Justices, as evidenced
by their dissents in RNC and Brakebill, who have suggested that a rule can become
the status quo if it was in place for a year beforehand, if it was in place for the most
191

Id. at 1210.
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recent primary, or if it was listed on the Secretary of State’s website in the months
just before the current election.195 Unlike the state-law frame, the recency frame
includes the reviewing court’s own order as a large part of the voter confusion
calculus.
The recency frame can be applied in two ways. At the very least, a “weak
recency” version of the frame mandates that a reviewing court balance how much
confusion its own order would create against how much confusion the district court
order, if left untouched, would create. Such an idea does not appear radical given
the commands of Purcell and the broader injunction jurisprudence to weigh the
relevant harms.196 A weak recency approach was taken by Justice Ginsburg in
Brakebill when she compared the harms that would result from the dissent’s wouldbe order to those from the Eighth Circuit’s.197 Taken to its extreme, however, a
“strong recency” version would mandate that an appellate court always defer to a
district court when the district court’s order was in place in prior elections or when
the appellate court order would upset the status quo “close” to election day,
regardless of how “closeness” is defined.198 It is unclear whether Justice Ginsburg
went as far as endorsing this approach in RNC. Her precise statement was that if the
district court should not have intervened because of the closeness of the election, as
the majority said, then the majority’s order is worse.199 This comment seems to be
debating the majority’s reasoning on its own terms—on the idea that timing alone is
dispositive—rather than necessarily espousing support for a “strong recency”
interpretation.
The recency frame, however conceptualized, has the benefit of providing a
more realistic conception of the status quo—one with a stronger connection to actual
voter confusion. An appellate order can, of course, confuse a voter even when it
restores the state law. The state law might be a new law that voters are not used to,
or it might have been superseded by an injunction for so long that voters are more
used to the rules set forth under the injunction, as in cases like Raysor where the
district court order controlled at the time of the last primary.200 By recognizing this,
the recency frame rejects the unrealistic assumption in the state law frame that voters
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Brakebill v. Jaeger, 139 S. Ct. 10 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Republican Nat’l
Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020) (per curiam). See supra Part II
for more discussion of these cases. To be sure, in Brakebill, Justice Ginsburg listed the last
two justifications together, so we cannot know whether the dissent would have found that
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See supra Part II.
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Brakebill, 139 S. Ct. at 10–11 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“True, an order by
this Court vacating the stay would. . . disrupt[] the status quo. . . . [But] [t]hat inconvenience
pales in comparison to the confusion caused by the Eighth Circuit’s order . . . .”).
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To be sure, if Purcell is not a standalone rule and merely one part of one factor in a
balancing analysis, then appellate courts should still be able to intervene if a balancing of the
factors calls for it.
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are perfectly informed as to the state law. Such a rejection also aligns with Purcell,
which itself assumes an uninformed voter can become confused.
3. Abandoning “Step Zero”
This all invites the question: which frame should courts use? The answer is
neither of them. The idea of the status quo undermines Purcell and is normatively
ill-advised. “Step zero” should thus be abandoned altogether. This subsection first
considers the “strong recency” frame before turning to the “weak recency” and statelaw frames.
First, the strong recency frame is most clearly incompatible with Purcell itself.
To be sure, the recency frames do identify an important logical tension inherent in
Purcell: the case commands an appellate court to do the very thing it counsels district
courts against doing—changing the rules close to an election. Yet although this
tension exists, Purcell condones the tension. The strong recency frame would rubber
stamp all district court action close to an election. Indeed, no matter how close the
district court’s order is to an election, an appellate court order will be closer,
meaning appellate courts could never restore the state law.201 Although there are
normative arguments for such a rule,202 it simply cannot be what Purcell stands for—
which itself overturned a district court order even when its own order was closer to
the election than the district court’s.203
A “strong recency” view also contradicts the central argument that the liberal
Justices have been advancing for years: Purcell is not a bright-line rule.204 If
appellate courts did not reserve the right to overturn district court orders close to
elections, the Purcell Principle would become a bright-line rule based only on
timing.205 There would be a “moratorium” on the Constitution as the election
approaches,206 but for the Supreme Court, not for the district court. And some things,
201

See Muller, supra note 175 (“That can’t be what Purcell dictates. Purcell’s entire
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like the necessity for clear guidance to lower courts across the country or the
importance of setting the law straight, might outweigh any confusion caused by an
appellate order. Suppose a district court closed hundreds of polling places under a
gross misinterpretation of the case law—would we want to let such an injunction
stand simply because it became the status quo?
Second, we are left with the state law and “weak recency” frames, both of which
conflict with Purcell but for a more fundamental reason: the status quo—the idea
these frames rely on—is itself incompatible with Purcell. The “step zero” inquiry
should therefore be abandoned by courts because it obscures, rather than illuminates,
a Purcell analysis.
Recall that the phrase “status quo” may have seeped into the doctrine through
Nken, which describes a stay as something that corrects a judicial disruption of the
legal status quo.207 The state law frame most directly transplants this idea into the
Purcell discourse by assuming that voter confusion should be measured by how far
the new rule strays from the state law status quo. The weak recency frame also
transplants the idea of the status quo into Purcell, but under a more realist conception
of the status quo—one that considers the status quo of knowledge among voters,
which may or may not track the legal status quo. The weak recency frame, in other
words, warns against disrupting some set of election procedures that the public is
used to.
Both approaches, however, commit an error by transplanting the idea of the
status quo into the Purcell doctrine in the first place. There is a critical difference
between the status quo that Nken refers to and the status quo that courts seem to
believe Purcell alludes to. Namely, Nken describes a legal status quo, which is
knowable: either the state law or the district court order controls. If a court departs
from the legal status quo, it will say so, as clear as day, in its order. But the legal
status quo has nothing to do with voter confusion because it has nothing to do with
whether voters understand the legal status quo. While the weak recency frame hews
closer to actual confusion than the state law frame, it still only measures confusion
through the proxy of what the court believes the status quo of voter knowledge to
be. Crucially, voter confusion is what Purcell warned against, not a disruption of the
status quo. Its language—“voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away
from the polls”—is ambivalent toward what some status quo was.208 Purcell only
discusses whether voters will be confused by the change. Confusion is, of course,
related to the idea of the status quo because voters might expect the so-called norm
when they show up to the polls, but the two ideas are not identical. By equating the
idea that courts should not cause confusion with the idea that courts should not
change the status quo, a court implicitly assumes that there is a relationship between
the two—that the status quo, legal or otherwise, mirrors the voter’s knowledge of
election procedures—which is not accurate.
In reality, the status quo is a poor proxy for voter confusion because it contains
a faulty assumption: a critical mass of voters is used to or knows some set of election
207
208

Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 429 (2009).
Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006).
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procedures. Yet identifying a status quo of voter knowledge is an elusive, and
perhaps impossible, task. Even assuming there is a knowable status quo, identifying
it necessarily involves a judgment about what the public considers to be the norm—
a difficult analysis for a court to undertake in a small time period with little to no
data on the public’s knowledge.209 But more importantly, there likely is no status
quo in Purcell cases because the status quo for any one voter is not necessarily the
status quo for another.
Brakebill serves as an example of this. There, the dissent argued that the rules
in place at the time of the primary became the dominant status quo for the following
general election.210 Yet consider that 60.1% of eligible voters turned out for the
general election in 2016,211 while only 28.5% turned out for the primaries earlier that
year.212 Such data suggests that there were likely two status quos in Brakebill. For
those who voted in the primary, the status quo was the rules in place at the time of
the primary, which were put in place by the district court. For those who did not vote
in the primary but only in the last general election, the status quo was the rules in
place during the last general election, which were set by state law. To add to the
problem, the state law changed in between the general elections, so the state law at
issue in Brakebill was not even the same state law that the former group of voters
was used to.213 Even more illuminating is the survey submitted to the district court,
which collected data on the North Dakota public’s knowledge of the state’s voting
procedures.214 The district court found that “knowledge levels regarding the [voting]
law are very low . . . especially among Native Americans.”215 Indeed, only 23% of
Native Americans knew that a voter identification law even existed and under 13%
had seen an announcement or advertisement from the state about the change in the
new voter identification law.216
The alternative to “step zero” is to return to the heart of the Purcell inquiry:
voter confusion. To be sure, this still involves difficult questions because the above
complications—lack of knowledge, lack of a uniform understanding, and difficulty
advertising changes—remain even without the proxy of the status quo. And things
209

Although the district court considered survey data in Brakebill, it seems unlikely
that similar data will be made available in every Purcell case. See Brakebill v. Jaeger, 139
S. Ct. 10, 10 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
210
Id.
211
2016 November General Election Turnout Rates, UNITED STATES ELECTION
PROJECT, http://www.electproject.org/2016g [https://perma.cc/BY5Y-TLPT] (last visited
Feb. 12, 2021).
212
Drew Desilver, Turnout Was High in the 2016 Primary Season, but Just Short of
2008 Record, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 10, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/06/10/turnout-was-high-in-the-2016-primary-season-but-just-short-of-2008record/ [https://perma.cc/ZX4Z-EQDB].
213
See Brakebill v. Jaeger, No. 1:16-CV-008, 2018 WL 1612190, at *1 (D.N.D. Apr.
3, 2018) (explaining that the state law was enjoined before the 2016 primary election and
amended in 2017), vacated and remanded, 932 F.3d 671 (8th Cir. 2019).
214
Id. at *2–3.
215
Id. at *3.
216
Id.
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that are relevant to the status quo, like the rule in place during the last election, can
still be relevant to a voter confusion analysis. The difference is that a voter confusion
analysis escapes the formalistic notion that these procedures necessarily mirror voter
knowledge. Instead, a more focused inquiry into confusion, the issue at the heart of
the matter, will allow courts to develop a clearer picture without the distorting effect
that a faulty conception of the status quo fosters. What is more, frameworks can be
developed to help determine whether voter confusion is relevant in any given case.
As shown in the next section, Purcell cases can be grouped into two categories, only
one of which tends not to produce meaningful voter confusion.
To put it in more concrete terms, let us return to the question of whether an
appellate court could ever properly stay its hand because of the confusion its own
order might produce. When Purcell is understood through a voter confusion lens,
the answer is yes—the same answer put forth by the dissent in Brakebill.217 But not
because, as the dissent suggested, the district court order became the so-called status
quo that now requires protection. Instead, an appellate court could decide to stay its
hand because Purcell asks the court to consider the voter confusion that could result
from conflicting orders—which necessarily includes its own order—and Purcell sits
within a larger balancing test that considers the public interest at large.218 Of course,
Purcell does not mandate that a court do so, as the Court in Purcell itself chose not
to stay its own hand. But the option is on the table in this equitable landscape.
In sum, determining the state of voter knowledge is a difficult judgment for a
court to make. But when courts discuss a “status quo” as though it is somehow
predictive of voter knowledge, they are both straying from Purcell’s command to
focus on confusion and distorting the inquiry into whether voters will be confused.
Accordingly, the “step zero” that has emerged in the case law should be abandoned
in favor of a tighter focus on voter confusion itself. This alternative is made easier
by the framework presented in the next section, which sorts orders into two
categories depending on the types of confusion they produce.
B. Purcell Typology: Positive and Negative
The case law reveals two main ways a court can abide by Purcell’s command
to avoid confusion and voter chill. This Article is the first to identify and taxonomize
them. First is when an appellate court applies Purcell “negatively”—to remove or
lessen restrictions on voting. The second is when a court applies Purcell
“positively”—to add restrictions on voting.219 The positive-negative framework
does not merely separate the two main types of Purcell cases that courts decide for
the sake of it. Instead, the dichotomy enjoys an important relationship with Purcell’s
central inquiry into voter confusion. Sorting the cases in this way reveals that the
217

Brakebill v. Jaeger, 139 S. Ct. 10, 10–11 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See supra Part I.B.
219
The “positive” and “negative” labels in no way imply normative value. Instead, the
labels “positive” and “negative” simply describe whether an appellate court’s order has the
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liberal Justices seem to believe that negative orders cannot cause, or, at the very
least, are unlikely to cause, voter confusion. This finding carries with it sizable
doctrinal implications because the vast majority of Purcell cases that the Supreme
Court has decided—ten out of thirteen—have been positive, restriction-adding
orders.220
Section B.1 describes how the initial order, often issued by a district court,
serves as the reference point in the framework. Sections B.2–3 describe how
reviewing courts apply Purcell positively and negatively, offering examples of how
each application plays out in practice. Section B.4 discusses additional factors to
consider when classifying orders, such as how the redistricting cases interact with
the positive-negative dichotomy. Section B.5 concludes by articulating why the
dichotomy matters: only positive orders tend to produce confusion that results in
voter suppression.
1. The Reference Point
When sorting cases into the positive-negative framework, the starting point is
the first instance of relief given to plaintiffs. This is usually provided by the district
court, although circuit courts and the Supreme Court sometimes issue injunctions on
their own.221 This initial form of relief can itself be either “positive” or “negative,”
depending on whether the order makes it easier or harder to vote.
Suppose that a district court, like the one in DNC v. Wisconsin, extends the
mail-in ballot deadline at the request of the plaintiff.222 Such an order is restrictionremoving because it allows the plaintiff more freedom to vote than the state law
previously allowed. Suppose now that rather than extending the mail-in ballot
deadline, a district court shortens the deadline at the request of a plaintiff. Such an
order is restriction-adding because it makes it harder to vote than under the state law
regime. Positive orders are, however, unlikely to occur at the district court level. In
fact, the Supreme Court has never heard a Purcell case in which the district court
added restrictions to a state law.223

220
The number is ten out of thirteen since Purcell was decided. If Purcell v. Gonzalez
itself is included in the calculus, the number of positive applications rises to eleven out of
fourteen. To be sure, determining what is and what is not a Purcell case requires judgment
calls, especially when some shadow docket orders contain no opinions at all, but all cases
included in this calculation are described in detail in Part II. One case in particular, McCrory
v. Harris, is harder to categorize but is assigned to the negative grouping. 136 S. Ct. 1001.
See infra Part III.B.4 (discussing redistricting cases).
221
See supra Part I.A.
222
See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 488 F.Supp. 3d 776, 784 (W.D. Wis.
2020) (granting plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and requiring the state to count
ballots postmarked by election day).
223
See supra Part II. This is perhaps because plaintiffs rarely ask courts to add
restrictions to the state law, especially when compared to the number that ask courts to lessen
restrictions.
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More commonly, a district court rejects a plaintiff’s request to remove
restrictions, thereby leaving current state law restrictions in place.224 In the mail-in
ballot scenario, for example, a district court might reject the plaintiff’s request to
extend the deadline, keeping the deadline where it was under state law. Although
this is the closest analog to a positive order, such an order cannot properly be
considered a positive application because it is not adding any restrictions to the
existing rule.225 An appellate court order that reinstates state law restrictions can,
however, be a positive application. Under the positive-negative framework,
appellate orders are considered in relation to the lower court order(s) on which they
rule. In other words, whether an appellate court applies Purcell positively or
negatively turns on whether it upholds or overturns a positive or negative district
court order, as the next two subsections illustrate.
2. Positive Applications
The first way a reviewing court can invoke Purcell is through a “positive”
application—one that adds or maintains restrictions on voting.226 The bulk of the
Supreme Court’s Purcell applications have been positive—in fact, all but three of
its applications added restrictions.227 And a positive application can occur in two
ways. The first, which represents most of the Supreme Court’s Purcell applications,
occurs when the reviewing court overturns a negative, or restriction-removing,
district court injunction.228 These decisions have the practical effect of adding
restrictions to voting because by staying the injunction, they reinstate a state law that
necessarily contained greater restrictions. For example, suppose a district court
enjoins voter identification requirements, and an appellate court stays that order. The
stay has the effect of reinstating those greater state law identification requirements
by removing the injunction placed upon them.229 The second way an appellate court
can apply Purcell positively is by upholding positive orders.230 This could occur if
224

For example, this occurred in Purcell itself. See Purcell v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 1, 3
(2006) (describing district court proceedings).
225
Ultimately, the positive-negative distinction is a guide to the types of confusion an
order is likely to cause. Because district court orders that refuse to change anything are
unlikely to cause confusion of any type, they have been left out of the positive-negative
analysis. See infra Part III.B.5.
226
Reviewing courts, of course, only “add” restrictions in comparison to the district
court order. When they apply Purcell positively, they do not add restrictions to the state
law—they merely reinstate the preexisting state law that itself contains greater restrictions
than the district court order.
227
See supra note 220 (illustrating that ten out of thirteen applications have been
positive).
228
See, e.g., Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205
(2020) (per curiam).
229
See, e.g., Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9, 9–10 (2014) (mem.) (refusing to vacate the
Fifth Circuit’s stay on a district court order that enjoined Texas voter identification
restrictions).
230
See, e.g., Raysor v. DeSantis, 140 S. Ct. 2600 (2020) (mem.).
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an appellate court upheld a positive district court order, but, as discussed, those
orders are rare. Positive applications more commonly occur when the Supreme
Court upholds a circuit court’s positive order—when a district court enjoins the state
law to remove restrictions, a circuit court adds those restrictions back, and the
Supreme Court upholds the circuit court’s decision to do so.
Two of the Court’s most recent applications illustrate how this looks in practice.
In RNC v. DNC, recall that the district court’s order extended the mail-in ballot
deadline.231 Such an order lessens voting restrictions by giving voters more time to
cast their ballots than the state law allowed, making it a negative order under the
framework. When the Supreme Court stayed that order, thereby reinstating the
earlier deadline under state law, the Supreme Court had the effect of adding
restrictions to voting.
Raysor v. Desantis was similar, albeit with the added layer of a circuit court’s
decision. The district court enjoined portions of a Florida law that restricted the
extent to which those with prior felony convictions could vote.232 Again, this was a
negative application because it removed impediments that a group of voters faced in
exercising their right to vote. The Eleventh Circuit stayed that order,233 which was a
positive application because—by reinstating the state law—the court added back the
voting restrictions. The Supreme Court refused to vacate the Eleventh Circuit’s
stay,234 which was also a positive application because it allowed the added
restrictions to remain in place. For the purposes of the framework, an added layer of
appellate review does not affect application type. If, like RNC, the case was appealed
directly from the district court to the Supreme Court, then the Supreme Court staying
the injunction by itself would also have been a positive application.
3. Negative Applications
The other type of Purcell application is a “negative” application—one that
removes or lessens voting restrictions. Like positive applications, a negative
application can occur in two ways. The first is when an appellate court upholds a
district court’s negative, restriction-removing injunction. For example, imagine that
the Court had upheld the district court’s extension of the mail-in ballot deadline in
RNC or DNC. The second is when an appellate court overturns a district court’s
positive, restriction-adding injunction. For example, suppose a district court
enjoined a state law and added restrictions to its voting procedures. An appellate
stay of that order would, by reinstating the less restrictive state law, have a negative,
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Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1206.
Raysor, 140 S. Ct. 2600, 2600 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
233
Id. at 2600–01.
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restriction-removing effect.235 At the Supreme Court level, negative applications are
uncommon: a majority of the Court has only applied Purcell negatively on three
occasions.236
One of those instances was Frank v. Walker.237 There, the district court enjoined
Wisconsin’s new voter identification requirements, which threatened to
disenfranchise up to 10% of registered voters in the state in the 2014 election.238
Such an order was negative because the order made it easier for more people—
namely those without qualifying identification—to vote. The Seventh Circuit issued
a positive application by staying the order and reinstating the restrictions.239 The
Supreme Court—in a likely six-Justice majority of Justices Kagan, Sotomayor,
Breyer, Souter, Ginsburg, and Roberts—vacated the Seventh Circuit’s stay.240 The
Court’s application of Purcell was negative because it reinstated the district court
order, which removed restrictions on voting.
4. Additional Considerations
The above represents the basic positive-negative framework, but two more
considerations are in order. First, the positive-negative dichotomy has no relation to
the formal ruling an appellate court enters (stay, denial of a stay, or its own
injunction) or to whether it reverses the court below. Instead, what guides the
positive-negative distinction is the nature of the order—whether it adds or removes
restrictions on voting. Imagine a district court enjoins a state law that restricts the
number of ballot drop boxes in a county. The district court’s order is negative
because it increases the number of ballot drop boxes available. If an appellate court
stays that injunction based on Purcell, the appellate court has applied Purcell to
strike down a negative order, one that removed restrictions, with its own positive
order. But now, imagine that the district court enters an order that restricts the
number of days in which voters can mail in their ballots. Then, if an appellate court
stays that injunction based on Purcell, it has applied Purcell to strike down a positive
order, one that added restrictions, with its own negative order. Even though the
appellate court’s formal ruling—a stay—was the same in both cases, whether it
applied Purcell positively or negatively differed.
Second, while most cases sort neatly into the positive-negative framework,
redistricting cases require further elaboration. Gerrymandering cases, which can be
brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under
235

But, as discussed in Part III.B.1., the second scenario is unlikely to come before the
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574 U.S. 929 (2014).
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See Frank v. Walker, 769 F.3d 494, 498 (7th Cir. 2014) (Williams, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 496–98 (majority opinion).
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See Frank, 574 U.S. at 929. As is often the case on the shadow docket, the Court did
not provide the names of the Justices in the majority. See supra notes 10–15 and
accompanying text. But Justices Alito, Thomas, and Scalia were the only Justices who noted
their dissent. Id.
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Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, allege that voting districts have been drawn
improperly.241 And courts’ remedies in gerrymandering cases often require that the
state legislature redraw its districts. Unlike most cases, where it is clear whether the
court is adding or removing restrictions, when a court makes a state redraw its
districts, it is less clear whether its order should be classified as positive or
negative.242
On the one hand, a district court order requiring redistricting is likely to cause
at least some “chaos” that Justice Kavanaugh warned of in Merrill v. Milligan.243 In
newly altered districts, candidates would need to appeal to new voters, and voters
would need to size up fresh candidates—all on short notice. That’s why in a set of
1960s cases that held district maps unconstitutional, the Court made their changes
effective for the next election cycle.244 On the other hand, although an order requiring
redistricting might add confusion, it does not necessarily add restrictions—everyone
affected can still vote even if in a different district. And in a different district, many
of those who previously lived in an unconstitutionally gerrymandered district would
have a greater ability to elect a candidate of their choice. In this sense, a court’s lack
of intervention could sometimes suppress more votes than a court’s intervention.245
When it comes to redistricting cases, then, whether an order requiring a new map is
positive or negative depends on the facts of the case at hand: the voter chill created
by a late switch to a new map must be weighed against the suppression that would
result from sticking with the existing, gerrymandered map.
In sum, Purcell cases can be taxonomized into two groups: positive orders that
add voting restrictions and negative orders that remove restrictions. Most of the
Supreme Court’s Purcell applications to date have been positive, restriction-adding
orders—likely under the theory that Purcell is a bright-line rule. This is a worrying
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For a discussion of redistricting claims under the Equal Protection Clause, see
Michael C. Li, The Surprise Return and Transformation of Racial Gerrymandering, 94
N.Y.U. L. REV. 136 (2019). For a discussion of claims under Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, see Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting
Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 692 (2006) (describing the differences between “vote denial”
and “vote dilution” claims).
242
For another discussion of how the court should weigh these cases, but one focusing
on Purcell’s interaction with the other factors in an injunction analysis, see Hasen, supra
note 2, at 441–43.
243
142 S. Ct. 879, 880 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
244
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964) (delaying relief until after the
present election despite finding the state’s apportionment scheme unconstitutional);
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34–36 (1968) (holding that the state was not required to
place a party on the ballot for the upcoming election, despite the fact that leaving the party
off the ballot was a constitutional violation).
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See Stephanopoulos, supra note 27 (“[J]udicial intervention isn’t the only step that
can lead to disenfranchisement. Judicial abstention can, too, when it allows an
unconstitutional policy that unjustifiably burdens voting to stay in effect. . . . Purcell’s own
goal of minimizing voters’ ‘incentive to remain away from the polls’ [can be] advanced by
courts entering the fray.” (quoting Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006))).
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trend because, as the next subsection shows, positive and negative orders tend to
cause vastly different types of confusion.
5. Why It Matters: Positive and Negative Orders Cause Different Types of
Confusion
So why does the positive-negative dichotomy matter? Purcell tells courts to
consider “voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the
polls”—but how should they do so? The positive-negative framework offers a way
for courts to measure confusion and disenfranchisement. It shows that positive and
negative orders lead to radically different types of voter confusion: only positive
orders tend to lead to confusion that results in disenfranchisement. Indeed, such an
idea appears to be motivating the liberal Justices’ thinking. While they have not
articulated a bright-line rule saying as much or categorized cases as “positive” or
“negative,” reading their dissents as a whole reveals that they seem to believe
negative orders cannot—or at least are unlikely to—cause the type of confusion that
Purcell protects against.
Imagine that a new state law requires voters to bring state-issued identification
to vote in person when the state previously required no forms of identification to
vote. Consider the following scenarios, with a particular focus on the way a voter
would be confused by each:
Scenario A: The district court enjoins the law. A year later, the circuit court
stays the order close to the election and reinstates the identification
requirements. Relying on Purcell, the Supreme Court leaves the stay in
place.
Scenario B: The district court refuses to enjoin the law. A year later, the
circuit court enjoins the law close to the election. Relying on Purcell, the
Supreme Court leaves the injunction in place.
Scenario A is an example of the Supreme Court applying Purcell positively,
while Scenario B is an example of the Court applying Purcell negatively. In both
cases, the circuit court changed an existing rule close to the election. But the sorts
of voter confusion caused by each order differs. In Scenario A, voters might be
unaware that the circuit court added identification requirements by reinstating the
state law. This kind of confusion runs the risk of disenfranchising voters because if
they believe the district court’s rule is still in place, they might show up to the polls
without the identification they need to vote.246 In Scenario B, voters might again be
246
To be sure, in many states, a voter in this situation could request a provisional ballot,
although some states are exempt from the federal law requiring provisional ballots and do
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unaware of the circuit court order just before the election. But this time, the circuit
court order removed requirements. Voters who, like in Scenario A, believe the old
rule is still in place will not be affected in the same way because, at worst, confused
voters will show up to the polls with more identification than necessary. True, those
voters will still be confused about what the rule is, but they will not be confused in
a way that results in their disenfranchisement—this is “no harm, no foul” confusion.
The Supreme Court, therefore, likely misapplied Purcell in Scenario A but not in
Scenario B.
To be sure, some voters could still be disenfranchised in Scenario B. If voters
who lack qualifying identification know about the state law that would prevent them
from voting but not about the circuit court’s order enjoining it, they will still believe
that they cannot vote. That, however, is hardly a result of the circuit court’s negative
order. Such confusion stems from the state law and would occur regardless of
whether or not the circuit court enjoined the state law—if anything, the circuit court
order at least gives these voters a chance. Additionally, some voters may be confused
in unpredictable ways because of a communication breakdown at some point along
the chain from court to voter. Whenever a rule is in place, whether it is changed or
not, there is the potential for a voter to be confused by something. That possibility,
though, does not mean that such confusion is likely as a general matter or that the
Supreme Court should cater to potential confusion because it is no more likely when
a court removes restrictions than when a court adds restrictions.
These scenarios illustrate that there is a general principle inherent in the
positive-negative dichotomy. When an order adds restrictions, the confusion
stemming from that order is likely to cause the sort of confusion that disenfranchises
voters. This is because confused voters in such a situation are prone to act in an
underinclusive manner—without the tools necessary to vote. When an order
removes restrictions, the confusion stemming from the order is likely to cause
confusion that results in harmless errors. In this situation, confused voters are likely
to act in an overinclusive manner—with more tools than necessary to vote.
The liberal Justices have taken a similar line of reasoning, without articulating
a rule, in some cases. In DNC v. Wisconsin, for instance, Justice Kagan argued that
the district court’s order extending the mail-in ballot deadline was unlikely to
confuse voters because a voter who was unaware of the district court’s extension

not use them. See Provisional Ballots, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, (Jan. 10, 2022),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/provisional-ballots.aspx#don’t%20
use [https://perma.cc/A878-LLWY] (noting that Idaho, Minnesota, and New Hampshire do
not use provisional ballots, and that North Dakota only uses them when polling place hours
are extended). Because of this, and because many provisional ballots are ultimately not
counted, this complication is assumed away for argument’s sake. See Drew Desilver, Most
Mail and Provisional Ballots got Counted in Past U.S. Elections – But Many Did Not, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/10/most-mailand-provisional-ballots-got-counted-in-past-u-s-elections-but-many-did-not/ [https://perma.
cc/Q9WR-GR98] (finding that in 2016, 28.5% of provisional ballots were not counted).
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would, at worst, mail their ballot earlier than needed.247 Similarly, in Brakebill,
Justice Ginsburg argued that the confusion that would result from requiring less
identification than the state law would, at worst, result in voters turning up to the
polls with more identification than necessary.248 And some circuit court judges have
made similar arguments.249 Yet there were other cases, such as RNC and Merrill, in
which this argument was available to the liberal Justices but not invoked.250 That
might be a function of the shadow docket, where cases are decided quickly, not fully
briefed, and the opinions lack detail.251 Or it might be a function of the fact that, in
at least some of those cases, the liberal Justices showed that voters’ confusion was
unlikely for other reasons and perhaps did not feel the need to reach this line of
argumentation.252 But these Justices do, as a general matter, seem to believe that
negative orders are less likely to cause confusion.
To be clear, this is a tendency and not a bright-line rule because negative orders
can cause voter confusion. Beyond the fact that any rule can cause confusion, there
might even be some circumstances in which a negative order will foreseeably cause
confusion. Suppose a state law requires voters to bring two forms of identification
to vote in person. If a district court strikes down the identification requirement in
part, such that voters now only need to bring one form of identification, some voters
might show up with no identification at all.253 It is not a stretch to imagine that some

247
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 42 (2020) (Kagan,
J., dissenting) (“It is hard to see how the extension of a ballot-receipt deadline could confuse
citizens about how to vote: At worst, a voter not informed of the new deadline would (if she
could) put her ballot in the mail a few days earlier than needed. Nor would that measure
discourage Wisconsin citizens from exercising their right to the franchise.”).
248
Brakebill v. Jaeger, 139 S. Ct. 10, 10 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
confusion arising from vacating the stay would at most lead to voters securing an additional
form of ID.”).
249
Democratic Nat’l Comm. V. Bostelmann, 977 F.3d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 2020)
(Rovner, J., dissenting) (concluding that the risk of voter confusion is minimal because the
changes the district court made “redound to the benefit of voters, and certainly do not lay a
trap for the unwary.”).
250
See supra Part II.
251
See supra Part I.
252
See, e.g., Merrill v. People First of Ala., 141 S. Ct. 25, 27 (2020) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the injunction will not create voter confusion because counties can
choose whether to adopt curbside voting or not); Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9, 10 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the district court’s injunction was not at fault for any
voter confusion because the state had almost a year to prepare for the possibility of the
injunction).
253
Thanks to Professor Michael S. Kang for this helpful example.
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headlines would read “Court Strikes Down Identification Requirement” or that the
nuances of the order would get lost in word-of-mouth communication.254
In sum, there is at least a general principle inherent in the positive-negative
dichotomy: positive orders tend to result in voter confusion that leads to voter
suppression, while negative orders tend to result in confusion that does not.
IV. NEGATIVE PURCELL APPLICATIONS AND PRESUMPTIVE VALIDITY
This Article has identified the two main types of orders found in Purcell
Principle cases: positive and negative. It has also identified that negative orders
generally pose less of a voter suppression risk than positive orders. Despite this, the
Supreme Court continues to favor positive applications over negative applications
at an alarmingly high rate. This Part, the Article’s central normative contribution,
explains why negative orders ought to enjoy a presumption of no confusion: when
an order removes restrictions, courts should presume that it does not cause voter
confusion until evidence suggests otherwise. This Part builds on an idea that some
Justices have hinted at in the Purcell jurisprudence to offer a fully developed account
not just of how Purcell should apply but of why it should apply in that way. In
addition, this Article explores the doctrinal history of Purcell and uses it to develop
a more holistic theory that reunites the Purcell Principle with its roots and with its
own text.
Section A discusses the mechanics of the presumption. Section B delves into
Purcell’s text and history to show that voter suppression is the north star guiding its
analysis. Lastly, Section C considers the normative benefits of the presumption.
A. The Presumption
The presumption itself is simple: courts should presume that negative,
restriction-removing orders do not cause voter confusion that results in voter chill.
This could come up in a Purcell analysis in two ways. A court could apply the
presumption to the negative order it is reviewing—such as when an appellate court
reviews a district court order. Or a court could apply the presumption to its own
order—that is, when considering whether its own negative order will cause
confusion, a court should presume that it will not. This leaves two remaining issues:
(i) why a presumption—not a rule—is the right approach, and (ii) how the
presumption fits into the Purcell analysis and what kind of showing rebuts the
presumption.
First, courts ought to adopt a presumption, not a bright-line rule, because the
positive-negative dichotomy predicts the types of confusion that orders tend to
254
See also Stephanopoulos, supra note 27 (“Take a requirement that voters procure
two witnesses for absentee ballots and then have them notarized. If a court struck down the
notarization rule but left the two-witness rule in place, then voters might be quite confused.
They might be unsure what their new obligations were, and some might throw up their hands
and forget about voting. But if a court invalidated both rules, then its ruling might be
substantially more understandable.”).

1122

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

produce. Some changes, like redistricting,255 are so fundamental to the electoral
system that they might cause detrimental voter confusion even if they remove
restrictions. Professor Stephanopoulos describes a category of “building blocks” that
often should not be changed close to an election because they comprise an “electoral
environment” that candidates, fundraising, media, and voters all rely on.256 For
example, a jurisdiction’s method of selecting candidates, such as at-large voting or
ranked-choice voting, are all building blocks that should remain unchanged before
an election.257 Other negative changes, even if they do not affect electoral building
blocks, might cause confusion due to their complicated nature, such as the prior
example of a district court removing only one out of two voter identification
requirements.258 These changes are not the norm, and only one Supreme Court case
applying the Purcell Principle has contemplated such a change,259 but they are
reason enough for negative orders to warrant a presumption rather than a rule. Not
to mention, Purcell is a doctrine steeped in equity—in fact, it is a balancing test
within a balancing test260—so it would make little sense to transform the Purcell
Principle into a bright-line rule.
Second, the presumption fits naturally into Purcell’s own balancing analysis.
While Purcell’s exact location in the injunction analysis remains somewhat
mysterious,261 scholars agree that it must live within the public interest prong of the
preliminary injunction, permanent injunction, and stay factor balancing tests.262 On
top of this, Purcell is itself a balancing test, evidenced by the fact the Court in Purcell
required lower courts to “weigh” both “the harms attendant upon issuance or
nonissuance of an injunction” (the injunction or stay balancing tests) as well as
“considerations specific to election cases” (Purcell’s balancing test).263 And the
Court made clear that those considerations include two things: voter confusion and
clear guidance to the state.264 So the Purcell Principle is a balancing test within a
balancing test.265 Like a Russian nesting doll, the presumption proposed in this
255

See supra Part III.B.4 (discussing the confusion that results from redistricting).
Stephanopoulos, supra note 27.
257
See id. (“Some policies, like a district plan or a jurisdiction’s underlying electoral
rule (at-large voting, plurality voting, ranked-choice voting, and so on), affect every aspect
of the political process. . . . Such basic building blocks of the election should almost never
be upset when time is limited.”).
258
See supra Part III.B.4 (discussing this and related examples).
259
See McCrory v. Harris, 136 S. Ct. 1001 (2016) (mem.) (refusing to stay an order
requiring that North Carolina redraw its congressional districts).
260
See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
261
Id.
262
Id.
263
Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006).
264
Id. at 4–5.
265
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 27 (“Purcell is just a part of the broader legal
analysis that courts conduct when determining whether to grant or lift a stay. . . . So Purcell
is an odd hill for proponents of rigid rules to die on. It lies in territory, the fashioning of
remedies, that has long been ceded to flexible standards.”).
256
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Article fits within Purcell’s command to consider voter confusion.266 The upshot of
all this is that because the presumption is located within balancing tests, even if the
litigants fail to rebut the presumption, a Court might still strike down a negative
order. It might find that the claim fails Purcell’s own balancing test, which could
happen if the order was egregiously unclear to state election administrators, or it
might find that the rest of the factors weigh against intervention, even when the
Purcell Principle supports intervention.267
B. The North Star: Voter Suppression
Purcell has two mandates: First, court orders should provide clear guidance to
election administrators and second, courts orders should not confuse voters. But for
too long, the Purcell Principle has developed as a rule independent of its reasons.
This Article is the first to bring the doctrine back to its roots, which are surprisingly
pro-voting, despite the way the Supreme Court has wielded the doctrine.268 As to
Purcell’s first mandate, these roots illustrate that courts merely need to make their
remedies clear to election administrators—not, as some have suggested, that courts
cannot burden administrators. As to the second mandate, the roots show that voter
confusion writ large is not what Purcell protects against. Instead, it protects only
against meaningful voter confusion—confusion that leads to disenfranchisement.
These insights lead to the conclusion that the positive-negative dichotomy and the
presumption resulting from it are natural outgrowths of the text of Purcell itself and
the doctrine underlying it. In practice, this means that the Supreme Court’s Purcell
jurisprudence is sorely misguided. While the Court tends to apply Purcell to negative
orders,269 doing so is in tension with the very ground Purcell stands upon. In fact,
the Court’s jurisprudence is a mirror image of what it should be: courts should tend
to let negative orders stand and tend to strike down positive orders.
Section B.1 discusses the text of the Purcell v. Gonzalez opinion. Section B.2
discusses the doctrine preceding Purcell.
1. The Text of Purcell
The text of Purcell itself illustrates that courts should only consider voter
confusion or burdens on election administrators when those things result in voter
suppression. In Purcell, the Supreme Court struck down a Ninth Circuit injunction
266

Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4.
See Democratic Nat’l Comm. V. Bostelmann, 977 F.3d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 2020)
(Rovner, J., dissenting) (noting that courts must “conscientiously evaluate all of the factors
that bear on the propriety of judicial intervention . . . including in particular the possibility
of voter confusion.”).
268
See Raysor v. DeSantis, 140 S. Ct. 2600, 2603 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(“[T]his Court has wielded Purcell as a reason to forbid courts to make voting safer during
a pandemic[.]”).
269
See supra note 220 (illustrating that ten out of thirteen of the Court’s orders are
positive, restriction-adding applications).
267
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on Arizona’s voter identification law.270 It did so because cases close to elections
trigger special considerations that the Ninth Circuit did not engage with.271
The Court held that courts must “weigh” the traditional injunction factors with
“considerations specific to election cases.”272 This is because “[c]ourt orders
affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter
confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls”—a risk that will
“increase” as the election draws nearer.273 The Court also included another
justification for its holding when closing out its opinion: “the necessity for clear
guidance” to state election administrators.274 With these few words, the Court gave
rise to the Purcell Principle.
But at some point, this message was scrambled. Despite its clear command to
“weigh” various “considerations” that “can” result in harm,275 the Court continues
to treat Purcell as a bright-line rule—or something very close to it.276 Beyond this,
the Court also misinterprets the meaning of two more of Purcell’s features: (a) voter
confusion and (b) clear guidance.
(a) Voter Confusion
First, the text of the opinion shows that voter confusion must lead to voter
suppression for courts to take confusion into account. The Court did not establish a
per se rule against court orders close to elections merely because such orders could
cause confusion. Rather, it cautioned that such orders could lead to “voter confusion
and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.”277 The most natural
reading of this phrase is that voter suppression stemming from voter confusion, not
voter confusion alone, is the operative inquiry.
As a starting point, we should assume that the Court included the second clause
for a reason.278 Nothing suggests that “consequent incentive to remain away from
the polls” is redundant with “voter confusion”—especially as the Court joined the
270

Purcell, 549 U.S. at 5.
Id.
272
Id. at 4.
273
Id. at 4–5.
274
Id. at 5 (“In view of the impending election, the necessity for clear guidance to the
State of Arizona, and our conclusion regarding the Court of Appeals’ issuance of the order
we vacate the order of the Court of Appeals.” (emphasis added)). Clear guidance, however,
is often treated secondarily to voter confusion. In the opinion itself, the “clear guidance”
language is offset from the main discussion and placed in the middle of a summary sentence
at the end of the opinion. See supra Part II (showing that the battle is often fought over voter
confusion, not clear guidance).
275
Id. at 4–5; see also Stephanopoulos, supra note 27.
276
See supra Part II.
277
Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4–5 (emphasis added).
278
Cf. LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS, 14–15 (2014) (“A basic principle of statutory
interpretation is that courts should ‘give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a
statute . . . .’” (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883))).
271
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two with the word “and,” suggesting that they are two distinct elements.279 So we
cannot, as the Court’s conservative majority often has,280 simply forget about the
second part of the sentence. It is also clear that voter confusion does not satisfy
Purcell by itself. First, the Court intentionally grouped the two together—if it
wanted to caution lower courts against creating either confusion or voter chill, then
it could have used “or” rather than “and.” To be sure, it is commonplace to use the
word “and” when listing two independently sufficient conditions. For example, the
statement “it gets cold in the winter and when it rains” does not necessarily mean
that it is cold when it rains only in the winter. While “or” would be more precise, the
court might not have been thinking so precisely. This counterargument, however, is
foreclosed by the fact that the Court used the term “and consequent.” This term
explicitly links voter confusion with voter chill by describing voter chill as an
outcome of voter confusion. But more importantly, it shows that the inquiry Purcell
endorsed focused on voter chill stemming from voter confusion, not merely voter
confusion. The context surrounding the text also supports this reading. Voter
confusion without voter chill is relatively harmless. Confusion alone might result in
a voter sending in a mail-in ballot earlier than needed or showing up at the polls with
more identification than they will be asked for,281 but mere inconvenience is not
something on which the Supreme Court would base a doctrine. In light of all this,
we can safely conclude that the operative inquiry in Purcell is whether “consequent”
voter suppression will result from any confusion.
In sum, the text of Purcell cautions courts against creating voter confusion
when, and only when, voter confusion leads to voter chill.

279

Cf. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 120 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The
principle [against surplusage] is sound, but . . . [i]t should not be used to distort ordinary
meaning. Nor should it be applied to the obvious instances of iteration to which lawyers,
alas, are particularly addicted . . . .”).
280
See, e.g., Republican Party of Pa. v. Degraffenreid, 141 S. Ct. 732, 734 (2021)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“To prevent confusion, we have thus repeatedly—although not as
consistently as we should—blocked rule changes made by courts close to an election.”
(emphasis added)); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 31
(2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[Purcell] not only prevents voter confusion but also
prevents election administrator confusion”) (emphasis added). By contrast, when the liberal
Justices refer to “voter confusion,” they often include references to “consequent incentive to
remain away from the polls” as well. Id. at 41–42. See, e.g., Raysor v. DeSantis, 140 S. Ct.
2600, 2603 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Eleventh Circuit has created the very
confusion and voter chill that Purcell counsels courts to avoid.” (emphasis added)
(quotations omitted)).
281
Cf., e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. at 28 (mail-in ballots); Veasey v.
Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014) (mem.) (addressing voter identification).
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(b) Clear Guidance
Second, the breadth of the Court’s command to give “clear guidance” to state
election administrators has been misunderstood.282 Courts and scholars often
conflate the idea that courts should provide clear guidance to election officials with
the idea that courts should not burden election officials. But these standards are not
the same. Interpreting the opinion to require the latter would swallow the equitable
injunction and Purcell Principle tests, barring almost any kind of judicial
intervention.
Judicial and scholarly interpretation of the “clear guidance” clause has been a
mixed bag. In DNC v. Wisconsin, Justice Kavanaugh understood Purcell to not only
caution against giving unclear guidance to election administrators,283 but also against
placing added burdens on them. To Justice Kavanaugh, it was relevant that the state
would have to create plans to carry out the injunction as well as determine how to
inform voters and election officials of it.284 Likewise, some scholars have
characterized the clause as a mandate to avoid placing “burdens on election
administrators.”285 By contrast, in RNC v. DNC, Justice Kagan appeared to
understand the clear guidance clause to command only clear guidance.286 And
Professor Stephanopoulos, although not directly interpreting the “clear guidance”
clause, argues that courts should not intervene under Purcell when doing so will lead
to administrator error.287
The second approach is a more accurate interpretation of Purcell’s text. To be
clear, election officials are important and selfless public servants, who deserve all
the credit they get and more. But Purcell is simply not a vehicle that protects their
workload. Not one line in the opinion discusses the burdens placed on administrators
or suggests that the Ninth Circuit should have addressed them. What Purcell says is
simple: give clear guidance to states. This distinction matters in practice because
282

Purcell, 549 U.S. at 5 (“In view of the impending election, the necessity for clear
guidance to the State of Arizona, and our conclusion regarding the Court of Appeals’
issuance of the order we vacate the order of the Court of Appeals.”).
283
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. at 31 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)
(“[Purcell] not only prevents voter confusion but also prevents election administrator
confusion[.]”).
284
Id. (“If a court alters election laws near an election, election administrators must first
understand the court’s injunction, then devise plans to implement that late-breaking
injunction, and then determine as necessary how best to inform voters, as well as state and
local election officials and volunteers, about those last-minute changes.”).
285
See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 2, at 464 (describing the Purcell Principle as an inquiry
in which “courts should weigh the risk of voter confusion and the burdens on election
administrators when courts make changes to election rules close to an election.”).
286
See Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1210
(2020) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“For this Court to upend the process—a day before the
April 7 postmark deadline—is sure to confound election officials and voters.”).
287
Stephanopoulos, supra note 27 (“Courts should avoid changing election regulations
near an election when, by doing so, they would likely cause election officials to make serious
mistakes.”).
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plenty of judicial orders will burden but not confuse election officials.288 The first
interpretation discussed above broadens Purcell far beyond its scope, fitting a
turbocharged engine in the car that courts are already driving recklessly. As the
Eleventh Circuit responded to an argument that the district court’s order was too
burdensome, “Purcell is not a magic wand that defendants can wave to make any
unconstitutional election restriction disappear so long as an impending election
exists.”289 The second interpretation also squares more naturally with the context
surrounding the “clear guidance” consideration. The idea behind Purcell is to
prevent disenfranchisement,290 and disenfranchisement occurs when election
officials do not know what the rules are or the rules are impossible to carry out, not
merely when the rules create more work. Not to mention, one would be hard-pressed
to find an order that does not create more work for officials—they will always have
to alter the website, inform poll workers, and so forth. Understanding Purcell to
counsel against any order that creates work for officials would be an absurd
interpretation that swallows the rest of the rule.
In sum, when the Court in Purcell stressed the need for “clear guidance,” it
meant just that—not an interpretation encompassing any burdens on officials that
would preclude district court intervention in almost every case. As the next
subsection shows, this interpretation is also supported by the doctrine underlying
Purcell.
2. Purcell in Light of the Doctrine
Purcell does not stand alone in the sea of election law jurisprudence, but up
until this point, scholarship has not explored the relationship between Purcell and
its predecessor cases. Courts and scholars tend to begin their inquiry with Purcell
itself, but the line of cases cautioning against late-in-the-day judicial intervention
has a long history. This section excavates Purcell’s long-forgotten roots, showing
that they stand for the same general principle as Purcell’s text: judicial intervention
is ill-advised only when it is likely to lead to voter suppression. This judicial north
star shines light on Purcell’s meaning, how courts should apply Purcell, and the
presumption of no confusion.
The Purcell Principle did not begin in 2006. As Judge Williams identified in
her Frank v. Walker dissent, “Purcell was not the first time the Court recognized
these realities.”291 She argued that Purcell is steeped in a line of cases going back to
the 1960s: Reynolds v. Sims,292 Williams v. Rhodes,293 and Westermann v. Nelson.294
288

Id. (“[A]dministrator error . . . isn’t equivalent to administrator inconvenience.”).
People First of Ala. v. Sec’y of State for Ala., 815 F. App’x 505, 514 (11th Cir.
2020) (Rosenbaum, J., concurring) (“At most, [the order] requires defendants to provide
additional training to ballot workers—a feat hardly impossible in the allotted time.”).
290
Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006).
291
Frank v. Walker, 769 F.3d 494, 499 (7th Cir. 2014) (Williams, J., dissenting).
292
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
293
393 U.S. 23 (1968).
294
409 U.S. 1236 (1972).
289
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Although Judge Williams cited these cases to argue that the Seventh Circuit should
restore the status quo, an idea this Article has rejected,295 delving into the cases
reveals something else entirely about Purcell. These cases show that voter
suppression is the key factor in determining whether judicial intervention is
warranted, and confusion to voters or election officials is important only if it chills
votes.
In Reynolds v. Sims, the Court held that the Alabama legislature was
apportioned unconstitutionality but did not require the state to remedy the violation
before the election.296 The Court stressed that it would be “unusual” for a court not
to be justified in preventing an election from taking place under an invalid
procedure, but it carved out an exception: “where an impending election is imminent
and a State’s election machinery is already in progress, equitable considerations
might justify a court in withholding the granting of immediately effective relief.”297
As to when these equitable considerations justify withholding relief, the Court
explained that courts should consider the closeness of the election and avoid making
unreasonable demands on election officials because doing so might cause a
“disruption of the election process.”298
The other cases took a similar line of reasoning. In Williams v. Rhodes, the
Court held that an Ohio law unconstitutionally excluded the Socialist Labor Party
from the ballot, but the court again refused to offer relief before the upcoming
election.299 It did so because the nature of the relief, at a date so close to the election,
would have caused “serious disruption of election process.”300 Crucially, the court
did not simply note that the change would cause voter confusion but that “the
confusion that would attend such a last-minute change poses a risk of interference
with the rights of other Ohio Citizens,” like absentee voters.301 Similarly, in
Westermann v. Nelson, the Court admitted that candidates who could not get on the
ballot “may” have had a valid claim but refused to offer relief before the election.302
It did so because Arizona’s “election machinery [was] already under way”—for
instance, some absentee ballots had already been sent out and returned—and its
“election processes would likely be disrupted by so late an action.”303
295

See supra Part III.A.
377 U.S. at 533 (1964) (establishing the “one person, one vote” principle).
297
Id. at 585.
298
Id. (emphasis added).
299
393 U.S. 23, 34–35 (1968).
300
See id. at 35 (accepting the State’s argument that the relief would cause “serious
disruption of election process” by noting that “it would be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, for [the state] to provide still another set of ballots.” (emphasis added)).
301
Id.
302
409 U.S. 1236, 1236 (1972).
303
Id. at 1236–37 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that it would be expensive
for the state to reprint all of the ballots, which might support the “burdens” interpretation of
296
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These cases share a guiding principle: disenfranchisement. None focus solely
on timing, confusion, or a lack of clear guidance. Instead, they focus on the
disruption of election processes. And they do so because when election machinery
is disrupted, citizens cannot vote.304 To be sure, timing, confusion, and clear
guidance do factor into their analyses. But these considerations are factors because
they might result in disenfranchisement, not because they are dispositive in their
own right. Compare, for example, Westermann with DNC v. Wisconsin. In the
former, the Court refused to provide relief at such a late date because ballots that
had already been returned would have to be discarded.305 In the latter, Justice
Kavanaugh refused to provide relief at such a late date because it was such a late
date.306
This precedent is the ground that Purcell grows upon. If the genealogy was not
clear enough, Purcell even explicitly invokes the same principle—voter confusion
matters when it leads to disenfranchisement—in the language “voter confusion and
consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.”307 Importantly, the precedent
expands upon the metes and bounds of the Purcell principle in a way that is sorely
lacking in modern Purcell jurisprudence. Purcell has developed as a rule
independent of its reasons—the reasons given in Reynolds, Williams, and
Westerman—and it is high time to realign Purcell with those reasons.
Such an interpretation of Purcell also tracks the Court’s broader election
administration case law, which stands for two general propositions. First, the Court’s
guiding principle in election administration cases is the vindication of the right to
vote. Take Bullock v. Carter, for instance, in which the Court struck down a Texas
law requiring candidates to pay a filing fee to get on the ballot.308 Even though the
state argued that the revenue from the fees was necessary to finance elections, the
Court held that the voters’ interest in electing a candidate of their choice was even
more important.309 Or take Tashjian v. Republican Party, in which the Court held
the clear guidance requirement. See supra Part IV.B.1(b). This language, however, was likely
dicta. At the end of its opinion, the court explicitly stated that it denied relief “because . . .
orderly election processes would likely be disrupted,” and did not list any other determinative
reasons. Westermann, 409 U.S. at 1236–37 (1972).
304
See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 35 (1968) (“[T]he confusion that would
attend such a last-minute change poses a risk of interference with the rights of Ohio Citizens
. . . ”).
305
Westermann, 409 U.S. at 1236–37.
306
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 30 (2020)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[T]he District Court changed Wisconsin’s election rules too
close to the election, in contravention of this Court’s precedents.”).
307
Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (emphasis added).
308
405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972).
309
Id. (“Without making light of the State’s interest . . . we fail to see such an element
of necessity in the State’s present means of financing primaries as to justify the resulting
incursion on the prerogatives of voters.”). See also, e.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party of
Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986) (holding that the state could not prevent a party from
opening up its primary to independent voters “to broaden the base of public participation in
and support for its activities.”).
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that Connecticut could not prevent a party from opening up its primary—allowing
independent voters to participate in it—despite the state arguing that open primaries
cause voter confusion.310 Second, even when the Court holds that a state interest in
a restriction outweighs a voter or party interest, the function of the state interest is
always to aid the political process.311 In other words, a state can overcome an
individual’s interest in voting, but only when the state’s interest ensures the right to
vote more generally.
In sum, like the text of Purcell itself, Purcell’s roots show that the analysis
should hinge on voter suppression—not voter confusion alone. The presumption of
no confusion reflects this finding and realigns the Purcell Principle’s sights on voter
suppression.
C. Benefits of the Presumption
There are also normative benefits to adopting the positive-negative dichotomy
and the presumption of no confusion. Beyond crafting a more coherent doctrine by
reconciling Purcell with its predecessor cases and the election administration case
law at large, the dichotomy promotes three goals: certainty, institutional legitimacy,
and deference to the best-positioned fact finder.
First, the Purcell Principle is riddled with uncertainty. To start, the Court has
not articulated where the principle fits within the injunction or stay factors; Merrill
v. Milligan even suggested that the principle might modify the factors.312 Courts
already have wide discretion when they consider the amorphous injunction and stay
factors, especially given the multitude of ways in which courts can balance those
factors against each other.313 And because Purcell lacks guardrails, courts have more
discretion still in emergency election cases.314 When applying Purcell, courts face a
menu of options, ranging from considering Purcell as one part of the public interest
factor to considering it as a bright-line rule that trumps all the equitable injunction
factors.315

310

479 U.S. at 220–22.
See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 532 U.S. 666 (1998) (upholding
a state law excluding an independent candidate because the law simplifies the process for
voters); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (upholding a state
fusion restriction because of the state’s interest in preventing political advertising channels
public focus into serious candidates); Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986)
(upholding a law placing ballot restrictions on minor candidates because of the state’s interest
in winnowing down candidates, which simplifies the process for voters).
312
142 S. Ct. 879, 881 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
313
See supra Part I.A (describing the threshold approach, the sequential approach, and
the sliding scale approach).
314
See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 977 F.3d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 2020)
(Rovner, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for not giving lower courts “more guidance
than Purcell and an occasional sentence or two in its stay rulings . . . .”).
315
See supra Part II (describing the differing approaches courts take).
311
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So lower courts have too much discretion and too little guidance—but how can
they conform their conduct to the doctrine without an explanation of what the
doctrine is?316 Purcell and its subsequent case law emerged from the shadow docket,
where cases are not fully briefed, written explanations are non-existent or short, and
the Justices do not always explain their votes.317 The contours of doctrine are
unknown because the Court has raised Purcell in the dark—a troubling feature for a
doctrine that decides some of our most critical election cases.318
But a clearer doctrine is possible. Scholars have rightfully suggested that the
Court clarify how Purcell interacts with the injunction factors,319 reform its shadow
docket procedures,320 and consider certain factors to determine when judicial
intervention is advisable.321 Few, however, seek to constrain Purcell itself.322 The
positive-negative dichotomy and the presumption of no confusion do just that by
transforming an open-ended inquiry into one with guardrails.323 Much like tiers of
scrutiny,324 the dichotomy performs a sorting function: positive orders are inherently
suspect, and negative orders are not. This gives the analysis a starting point. Further,
because courts are forced to explain when a positive order raises a Purcell concern,
the presumption naturally leads to a more fleshed-out doctrine. Over time, courts
will fill out exceptions to the presumption, which will help explain the kinds of
intervention that Purcell does and does not counsel against. And by providing lower
316

See Baude, supra note 11, at 14 (“[I]t is difficult for lower courts to follow the
Supreme Court’s lead without an explanation of where they are being led.”). The shadow
docket also reduces accountability because Justices do not have to put their name next to a
decision, making it impossible for reporters and academics to point out inconsistent
positions. See Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 19 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33, 42 (1994)
(stating that “[e]ven if [a Justice] do[es] not personally write the majority or the dissent, their
name will be subscribed to the one view or the other. They cannot, without risk of public
embarrassment, meander back and forth”).
317
See supra notes 10–15 and accompanying text.
318
See Hasen, supra note 14 (noting that piecing together shadow docket orders is
“guess work.”).
319
See, e.g., Gilleran, supra note 26, at 468–70.
320
See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 2, at 461–63 (proposing that the Court should explain
its shadow docket rulings, even if it must do so after the fact, much like some lower courts);
Gilleran, supra note 26, at 470–71 (proposing the same); Baude, supra note 11, at 18
(proposing that the Court disclose the vote of each justice).
321
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 27.
322
Professor Stephanopoulos’s proposal is the exception. See id. And to be sure, a
bright-line rule that no court orders may take effect after some predetermined date would
promote the most certainty. See Gilleran, supra note 26, at 466 (identifying six weeks as the
“zone of danger” in modern Purcell jurisprudence). But this would make certainty the sole
consideration, in contravention of Purcell’s text, history, and the fundamental equitable
principles in the body of law in which it sits. See supra Part I.
323
The proposal set forth here could even work in conjunction with Professor
Stephanopoulos’s proposal by acting as a device to evaluate the first three factors in his
framework. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 27.
324
See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (describing the tiers of scrutiny).
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courts with an established framework within which to work, the dichotomy and
presumption will also provide state legislatures, election officials, and plaintiffs with
much-needed predictability.
Second, emergency election cases are so intertwined with election outcomes
that the Court risks denting its institutional legitimacy with every Purcell Principle
decision. A line of scholarship suggests that, because the Supreme Court cannot
enforce orders itself and relies on voluntary compliance,325 the Justices are “keenly
aware” of preserving the Court’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public.326 Yet, in
Purcell, the Court has crafted a doctrine in which Republican-backed voting
restrictions almost always win.327 Since 2006, the Court has increasingly sided in
favor of upholding voting restrictions, and in 2020 it did so in every single one of
its Purcell cases—almost always along partisan lines.328 This is against the backdrop
of increasingly “hyperpartisan” election litigation in which political actors nakedly
seek to manipulate the rules of the game for partisan advantage.329 The positivenegative dichotomy and the presumption of no confusion proposed by this Article
offer courts a legitimacy buffer. The dichotomy and the presumption are objective,
repeatable tools that sort cases into one of two categories, with an established
presumption that always accompanies one category. Because this makes the Court
more predictable, it goes some way to dispelling the notion that the Court is acting
under ulterior motives in these highly charged election cases. By announcing a
prospective rule, and one that requires an explanation of the evidence should the

325

See James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, The Legitimacy of the Supreme Court:
Conventional Wisdoms and Recent Challenges Thereto, 10 ANNU. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 201,
203 n.4 (2014) (noting that after Worcester v. Georgia, Andrew Jackson famously remarked,
“John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it.”).
326
Id. at 201–03.
327
See supra Part II; see also, e.g., Julián Aguilar, Voter ID Passes House After Long,
Emotional Debate, TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 23, 2011, 6:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/20
11/03/23/voter-id-passes-house-after-long-emotional-debate/
[https://perma.cc/GZ8GY4U5] (illustrating the Republican support and Democrat opposition to the legislation that
was allowed by the Supreme Court in Veasey v. Perry); Zach Montellaro, Supreme Court
Sides with Republicans, Reinstates Witness Requirement in South Carolina, POLITICO (Oct.
5, 2020, 10:03 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/05/supreme-court-reinstateswitness-requirement-south-carolina-426652 [https://perma.cc/R96Z-NSJ6] (describing the
decision in Andino v. Middleton as a ”victory for Republicans”); Tim O’Donnell, Arizona
GOP Lawyer Tells Supreme Court the Party Needs Certain Voting Restrictions to Compete
with Democrats, THE WEEK (March 2, 2021), https://theweek.com/speedreads/969826/ariz
ona-gop-lawyer-tells-supreme-court-party-needs-certain-voting-restrictions-compete-demo
crats [https://perma.cc/96AL-RXB2] (quoting an RNC lawyer in Supreme Court oral
argument admitting that striking down restrictions “puts [Republicans] at a competitive
disadvantage relative to Democrats”).
328
See supra Part II.
329
See generally Michael S. Kang, Voting Rights from Judge Frank Johnson to Modern
Hyperpolarization, 71 ALA. L. REV. 793, 801–08 (2020) (discussing hyperpartisanship in
election administration).
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court wish to restrict voting, the Court can distance itself from accusations that it is
restricting voting for political reasons.
Third, the presumption of no confusion best positions courts according to their
capabilities. Consider the two forces at issue in a Purcell case. When the initial court
issues an injunction, it does so because it concludes that an election procedure is
likely unlawful—not something to take lightly.330 When a reviewing court stays that
injunction, it does so because it concludes that the injunction might cause voter
confusion, not necessarily because the lower court is incorrect about the illegality of
the procedure.331 And reviewing courts sometimes do so only because the order
came close to the election, without any evidence that the order will confuse voters.332
But consider the positions of these two courts. The initial court—most often a district
court—reviews the evidence, hears the parties’ arguments, and sits closest to the
facts on the ground.333 The reviewing court, on the other hand, receives little briefing
and perhaps no oral argument.334 The presumption safeguards against this imbalance
by identifying orders that are unlikely to cause confusion and requiring a greater
showing to overturn those orders. It prevents a reviewing court from reinstating a
potentially unlawful procedure based on a platitude—courts should not intervene
close to elections—that might not track reality in the case at hand.
In sum, the presumption is a simple tool that assists courts faced with the
question of whether it is too close to an election to change the rules. Importantly, the
presumption does so in a way that both reshapes the Purcell Principle into its
intended form and offers a host of normative benefits to courts and the development
of the doctrine.
CONCLUSION
The Purcell Principle is now on the big stage—it has decided, and will continue
to decide, some of our most consequential election litigation. But it’s an
underdeveloped character. The Supreme Court has overwhelmingly used Purcell to
uphold voting restrictions. And the Court has done so under the theory that Purcell
is a bright-line rule, or something very close to that. Yet Purcell calls for a balancing
330
More precisely, it does so after considering four factors, the weightiest of which is
likelihood of success on the merits. See supra Part I.A (describing the test courts apply to
motions for preliminary and permanent injunctions).
331
To be sure, a reviewing court could stay an injunction both because it concludes
Purcell counsels against the change and because it concludes the procedure is likely lawful.
See supra Part I.A.
332
See, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 34
(2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (concluding that the district court’s injunction was
improper for three reasons, one of which was that “[t]he District Court changed the state
election laws too close to the election,” and the other two of which had no relation to voter
confusion (emphasis added)).
333
See generally Tokaji, supra note 24.
334
See supra notes 10–15 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court’s
shadow docket procedures).
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analysis, not a bright-line rule. Unfortunately, lower courts have little to go by when
engaging in that balancing analysis. This Article offers a solution. Orders in
emergency election cases can be grouped into two categories: positive orders (which
add voting restrictions) and negative orders (which remove restrictions). A positive
order risks disenfranchising voters who mistakenly believe that an old, less rigorous
voting rule is still in effect. But negative orders do not present the same risk because
a voter acting in accordance with a prior, more rigorous rule will likely still be able
to vote. To account for that reality, this Article—drawing on the text of Purcell and
its predecessor cases—crafts a “presumption of no confusion”: negative orders are
presumed not to confuse voters in a way that leads to disenfranchisement until
evidence suggests that they do, in fact, disenfranchise voters. Applying the
presumption to the Supreme Court’s precedent shows that Purcell Principle doctrine
is a near mirror image of what it should be. With our elections hanging in the
balance, it is high time to bring Purcell back in line with its rationale.

